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I. Introduction
In Part A of this essay, "The Killing Fields"1, I developed a critique of the
disciplinary impulses that underlie modern law and legal theory.
Invoking a number of perspectives and a plurality of analyses, I proposed
that male-stream legal theory and contemporary law both assume as
inevitable, and legitimize as appropriate, the funnelling of violence
through law. The problem with a funnel, however, is that it does not
curtail or reduce that which is channelled through it. On the contrary, to
funnel is to condense and to intensify. Viewed from this perspective,
interpreted from the bottom up, law and legal theory are not the
antithesis of violence but rather its apotheosis.
Critique, however, can only take us so far, and alternative
consciousness is not changed reality. In this second part of the essay, I
attempt to cautiously outline a reconstructive sequel that suggests the
possibility of making law and jurisprudence "otherwise". Specifically, I
filter my reflections and tentative proposals through the critical prism of
feminist theory and practice. Moreover, paralleling the pattern of
argument in the first part of the essay, I will draw on "knowledges" that
have, traditionally, either been alien to, or marginalized by, conventional
jurisprudential inquiry. In this way, I hope to provide some critical
distance on the theory and practice of modern law (and its hegemonic
propensities) thereby enabling us to envision, even if only for a moment,
the possible nature of a postmodern, postpatriarchal juridical regime.
In section II of this part of the essay, through an analysis of feminist
literary criticism and fenJ.inist psychoanalysis, I outline two of the
predominant themes that have, historically, pervaded feminist analysis:
equalitarianism and gynocentrism. However, rather than seeing these
approaches as being in conflict or antithetical, I will argue that, though in
tension, they are potentially compatible and even mutually reinforcing. I
will concretize this discussion through an affirmative interpretation of the
analyses of Carol Gilligan and Catharine MacKinnon. 1a
In section III, I relate these more thematic discussions to an overview
of feminist responses to pornography, while in section IV, I suggest that
the feminist turn to law, as it is currently constituted, while being part of
the solution, tends to reinforce part of the thanatical problem. The
conclusion attempts, briefly, to identify some of the strengths and
1. (1989), 12 Dalhousie L. J. 298. For acknowledgements and caveats see Part A, footnotes
I and 12. In particular, I am grateful for the critical commentary of Alexandra Z.
Dobrowolsky.
la. This essay was completed prior to the publication of Carol Gilligan et al., Mapping The
Moral Domain (1989) and Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
(1989).
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weaknesses of the various theses presented in "Nomos and Thanatos,
Parts A and B."
('

II. Feminism
1) The Significance ofFeminism
"The principal objective of feminist criticism has always been political: it
seeks to expose, not to perpetuate, patriarchal practices."
Toril Moi2

('

Feminism, I think, is at the cutting edge of progressive social movements
within post-industrial society. Feminism, by its very existence,
demonstrates the poverty of liberalism's commitment to equality. It seeks
to realize what for liberalism has been, at best, pious platitudes,3 at worst,
ideological obfuscation, chicanery and apologetics.4 Feminism is
progressive in the sense that it recognizes and acts upon the needs of
women in contemporary society in order to help them achieve
substantive equality. It aspires to a full recognition of women's humanity.
Feminism helps.
Feminism can be distinguished from other progressive movements in
that it is radically effective. It grows out of, and is underpinned by, the
lived experiences of women and continually strives to improve the social,
economic and political conditions within which women live. Whereas
Marxism has been effectively relegated to the peripheral of the academy
(at least in the rich western countries), feminism is a constitutive element
of modem political practice. Moreover, social democracy, a stunted
hybrid of socialism and liberalis�, has proved itself incapable of doing
more than making minor modifications to the basic structure of society,
even when it can work out what it wants to do.
Critical theory, while perhaps the most progressive social theory, has
remained just that, theory. In both its social-philosophical and legal
manifestations it is very much the product of celebrated male professors
at prestigious universities. For most, it is unintelligible and inaccessible, a
sophisticated and convoluted critique with almost no direct or immediate
political relevance. Although visionary, it has not yet made its way into
the interstices of everyday human interaction. Critical theory, at this time,
lacks both the means to communicate and a productive/receptive
constituency.

2. Sexual/Textual Politics (1986) xiv.
3. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (1971).
4. Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism" in Public and Private Morality 113 (S. Hampshire ed.
1978); Taking Rights Seriously (1978); A Matter of Principle (1984); Law's Empire (1986).
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Feminism has advantages over all the foregoing. First and foremost, it
is existentially located and radically contextual. It never forgets its
experiential roots, its raison d'etre and its ultimate purpose: the
achievement of self determination, "home-rule", 5 and substantive
equality for women. Second, although it is reflective and theoretical, it is
also driven by political necessity and pragmatism. Feminism strives, not
without success, to maintain the link between theory and practice. Third,
it is in the political ascendency. From being an outlandish and illegitimate
quirk in the nineteenth century, it has gradually infiltrated the ranks of
both liberalism and socialism, discovered their limitations, and
transcended them, to espouse its own worldview.
That worldview is large. Feminism does not aspire to being just
another pluralist constituency. It does not limit its agenda to incremental
reformism, although that is one strategy available to feminism. Rather,
feminism seeks to be transgressive and transformative. It is transgressive
in the sense that its ambition is to go beyond the realm of what has
hitherto been considered as the limits of the possible.6 Feminism unmasks
the repressive tolerance of rationalism - the "man on the Clapham
omnibus" - to adumbrate the deep structured inequality, indeed
misogyny, of contemporary society.
Significantly, many feminists argue that for this transgressive dynamic
to be effective there must also be radical transformation. However,
transformation is not to be confused with revolution, with women
replacing the proletariat as the vanguard leading us into the millenium.
Rather, transformation demands a complete restructuring and
dehierarchicalization of human interaction in order to eradicate the
massive imbalance in gender relations. Only in this way can substantive
equality be achieved. In turn, this egalitarian dynamic simultaneously
invokes and motivates a reconstitution of contemporary value structures
so as to de-centre the excessively individualistic ethic which is
characteristic of contemporary society and to emphasize a more inter
subjective one. Feminism's long term goal is therefore large: a complete
reworking of our interpersonal relations, a reconstruction of the basic
structures of society, and an alternative understanding of what we have
historically known as "human nature''.7
5. Christine Boyle, "Home Rule for Women: Power Sharing Between Men and Women"
(1983), 7 Dalhousie L.J. 790.
6. In this sense feminism shares with modernism the disbelief that conventional wisdom is as
constraining as it is facilitative of our human potential. However, as we shall see below,
feminism goes beyond modernism by providing tentative suggestions as to what "otherwise"
might mean.
7. Marilyn French, Beyond Power (1985) ch. 6, "Feminism".
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Themes ofFeminism
Feminism is, and always has been, a heterogeneous and polyvocal
"movement", one which has undergone numerous metamorphoses over
the period of its existence.8 Although this lack of fixity may mean that
there is no "one true essential feminism" thereby rendering feminism
undefinable, it is a veritable strength in that it allows for diversity,
historical contingency, openness, ongoing dialogue and self-criticism. It
renders feminism a dynamic and progressive movement.
However, despite this heterogeneity, on my understanding, it is
possible to discern, in particular, two pervasive themes9 or traditions
which have manifested themselves, with various intensities, in the works
and programmes of different participants at different times. 10 As I shall
suggest, these two themes co-exist in a mutually reinforcing tension11
2)

,

8. There are many different feminist voices, including, for example,
radical feminism: Zillah Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (1981), Liz
Stanley and Sue Wise, Breaking Out, Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research (1983);
marxist feminism: Charnie Guettel, Marxism and Feminism (1974), Lydia Sargent (ed.)
Women and Revolution (1981);
socialist feminism: Mary O'Brien, The Politics ofReproduction (1981);
critical legal feminism: Fran Olsen, "The Family and the Market" (1983), 96 Harvard L.Rev.
1497, "The Sex of Law" (unpublished manuscript 1984);
psychoanalytic feminism: Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982). [Hereinafter cited
as Voice"];
lesbian feminism: Adrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence"
(1980), 5 Signs 631;
black feminism: Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (1984);
existentialist feminism: Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1957);
liberal feminism: Elizabeth Wolgast, Equality and the Rights of Women (1980), Ann Scales,
"Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1980-81), 56 Indiana L.J. 375, Wendy Williams, "The
Equality Crisis" (1982), 7 Womens' Rights Law Reporter 175, Susan Okin, Women in
Western Political Thought (1979), "Justice and Gender", 16 Philosophy and Public Affairs 42
(1987), Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (1981), Janet Radcliffe Richards, The
Skeptical Feminist (1980).
For a useful overview of various feminist perspectives see A. Jagger, "Political Philosphies
of Women's Liberation" in Feminism and Philosophy 7 (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston, J.
English, eds. 1977).
9. See also Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, "Introduction: Feminism as Critique"
(1986), 5 Praxis International 365; K. Lahey, "Feminism, Theory and Method" (April 1984),
(Unpublished Paper, presented at special conference on Feminist Legal Theory, Osgoode Hall
Law School); "Equality and Specificity" (unpublished manuscript).
10. It is important that I point out that my claim is not that these two themes, either
conjunctively or in opposition, capture the essence of feminism; they are not necessarily its
determining features. There are many other vitally important cross-currents in the matrix of
feminism which contribute immensely to the richness and novelty of both its theory and
practice. I concentrate on these aspects because they have a direct and immediate impact upon
the nature and direction of feminist jurisprudence. See further, Julia Kristeva, "Women's
Time" (1981), 7 Signs 13.
11. I use the term "tension" in preference to the more vogueish "contradiction" because,
politically, a tension can be more creative than a potentially polarizing and stultifying
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which contributes greatly to the reconstructive nature of feminism. I shall
characterize12 these as the "equality approach" and the "gynocentric
approach.''
The Equality Approach
Historically, equalitarianism has been the dominant organizing principle
or concept for feminism. The basic claim of the equality approach is that
men and women share a common humanity, that they are fundamentally
equal and that there is no justifiable reason to treat one group as different
from the other.13 Consequently, women are entitled to participate in all
aspects of contemporary society. The equalitarian feminist demand is for:
a)

"the full extension of political, civic and juridical equality to women; the
rights to public political participation; the realization of social justice in the
workplace and other institutions and the legal abolition of sex
discrimination such as to allow women to become full economic, civic and
political agents." 14
contradiction which may assume a non-transcendable dichotomy. See also Fran Olsen, "The
Family and the Market," supra note 8.
12. James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (1985) draws an important distinction
between characterize and caricature. I propose to do the former.
13. For classic statements of this position see Mary Wollenstonecroft, A Vindication of the
Rights of Women (1792); John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill "The Subjection of
Women" in Essays on Sex Equality 125 (A. Rossi ed. 1970); As framed by Elizabeth Cady
Stanton et al. in the celebrated Seneca Fulls Declaration, feminism considers
these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by
their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.
For a brief review of aspects of the history of women's shifting attitudes on difference and
equality, see Ellen Dubois in "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A
Conversation" (1985), 34 Buffalo L.Rev. 11 [hereinafter cited as "Discourse"]; Janet Radcliffe
Richards, The Skeptical Feminist (1980). E. Lanz and B. Myerhoff even suggest that equality
is a reality in many aspects of contemporary American life, The Feminization of America
(1985). For a useful brief compilation of French women's claims for equality over the last three
centuries, see, New French Feminisms 6-7, 28-29 (E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1980).
14. �ee Benhabib and Cornell, supra, note 9. See also: Yolande Cohen "Thoughts on Women
and Power" in G. Finn and A. Miles Feminism in Canada (1983), 229, 235. Equalitarianism
was basic tenet of both the E.R.A. movement and the supporters of entrenching the equality
provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the gender
neutralization of the Criminal Code to reclassify "rape" as "sexual assault". It is also the basic
position adopted by the suffragettes, National Organization for Women, and "La Ligue" now "le Droit des Femmes" in France.
It is important to point out that the quotation in the text is not suggesting what is the essence
of "equality". Rather it is an attempt to capture what, historically, has been the nature,
aspirations and significance of most feminist claims to equality. For a useful discussion of
competing interpretations/visions of equality see Colleen Sheppard, "Equality, Ideology and
Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in Charterwatch 195
(C. Boyle, A.W. MacKay, E. McBride, J.A. Yogis eds. 1986). Sheppard discusses the important
differences between conservative, liberal and post-liberal conceptions of equality.
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Equalitarian feminists also suggest that to accept a distinction based on
gender or reproductive ability is to either risk15 or tolerate a hierarchical
dualism in which men dominate and women are subordinate.
Equalitarians argue that in the male constructed world in which we live,
difference equals domination.16 It risks confining women to he "moral
neatness of the female tended hearth". 17 Consequently, some equalitarian
feminists reject what might be called "feminine values" as relics of
oppression. 18
b)

The Gynocentric Approach
"Feminine values are the means of our oppression, the only place we are
allowed to be; but they are also potentially subversive because they are so
order outside ourselves."
contradictory to the established
·
.Yolande Cohen19

The articulation of the gynocentric perspective is of more recent vintage20
in feminism and is still in embryonic form. The basic claim of the
gynocentric approach21 is that there are important distinctions between
15. See, for example, Wendy Williams' call for an absolute sex neutrality:
If we can't have it both ways, we need to think very carefully which way we chose.
"The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Courts, Culture and Feminism" (1982), 7
Women's Rights L.R. 175, 196.
16. Catharine MacKinnon, "On Difference and Dominance" Feminism Unmodified (1987)
[hereinafter cited as Feminism Unmodified]. It is important to point out that I am not
n�rily identifying equalitarianism with liberal feminism. Although both John Stuart Mill
and Catharine MacKinnon may favour equality over difference it can hardly be said that the
latter is a liberal. By the same token, those who favour gynocentrism may also have very
different politico-economic visions. Feminism throws a spanner in the works of traditional
political pigeon-holing.
17. I.M. Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public" (1986), 56 Praxis International 381, 389.
18. Angela Miles posits that such a rejection can be identified in the works of, inter alia,
Simone de Beauvoir, Second Sex, 23-25 (1953); Shulamith Firestone, Dialectic ofSex (1970);
Juliet Mitchell, "Women: the longest revolution" (1966), 40 New Left Rev. 11, and "Women:
the longest revolution" (1967), 41 New Left Rev. 81; Betty Friedan, Feminine Mystique 55; Ti
Gr.ace Atkinson, Amazon Odyssey (1974); Jeffner Allen, "Motherhood: The Annihilation of
Women" in Mothering 315 (J. Trebilcock ed. 1984).
19. Cohen, supra note 14, at 245.
20. Gynocentrism is not a completely new phenomenon in that, historically, there have been
several feminist activists and theorists who generally fit this perspective. For discussion see:
Michele Riot-Sarcey and Elani Varikas, "Feminist Consciousness in the 19th Century" (1986),
5 Praxis International 443; Sklar, "Hull House in the 1890's: A Community of Women
Reformers" (1985), 10 Signs 658.
21. For the classic collection of articles which incorporate this viewpoint which has influenced
my own thoughts significantly see Feminism in Canada, supra, note 14. Angela Miles describes
this project as "Integrative Feminism", ibid. at 12. See also her "The Integrative Feminine
Principle in North American Feminist Radicalism: Value Basis of a New Feminism" (1981),
4 Women's Studies International Quarterly 481 (hereinafter cited as I.F.P.J; "Integrative
Feminism" (1984), Fireweed (hereinafter cited as I.F.]. Conspicuous by its absence in this
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men and women, that although this awareness has historically operated
to the disadvantage of women, there is something valuable within this
feminine culture that should be identified, preserved, extended and
shifted from "margin to centre"22 rather than be surrounded or
abandoned in the quest for equality. This approach seeks to affirm and
(re)valorize characteristics, activities and values such as contextualism
and holism; compassion and responsibility; nurturing and sharing;
cooperation and interdependence; relationalism and empathy; intuition
and emotion.23 Its challenge and re-vision is therefore ambitious: it rejects
the contemporary traditions of moral, political and legal life and aspires
to reconstruct the whole of human interaction on the basis of pro-social,
pro-creative, anti-destructive24 and (re)productive25 values. Gynocentrism
interdisciplinary collection is any discussion of law. See, however, K. Lahey, supra note 9 and
Colleen Sheppard, supra note 14, at 216-223.
The sources of gynocentrism and the documentation of women's difference are varied, and
often appear as subtexts rather than explicit, fully recognized themes. Mary O'Brien, Politics of
Reproduction (1981), relates gynocentrism to the birthing process, as does A. Rich, Of Women
Born (1976). Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976), Nancy
Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender
(1978) and Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements ofthe
Human Malaise (1976) relate it to psychosocial analysis of human development. Carol
Gilligan, In a Different Voice ( 1982) outlines an alternative moral structure for women, which
differs from the abstract sense of justice which predominates today. Several political
perspectives also incorporate this view: A. Dworkin, Our Blood 63-64 (1976); Capitalist
Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism (Z. Eisenstein ed. 1979); L. Fritz, Thinking
Like a Woman (1975); N. Harstock, "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism" in Discovering Reality, 283 (S. Harding and M.
Hintikka eds. 1983).
See also, Barbara Burris, "The Fourth World Manifesto" in A. Koedt et al. Radical
Feminism (1973); B. Ehrenreicb and D. English, For Her Own Good· 150 Years of the Experts
Advice to Women (1978), at 342; Roxanne Dunbar, "Female Revolution as the Basis for
Social Revolution" in R. Morgan, Sisterhood Is Powerful 677 (1970); Sheila Rowbotham,
Womans Consciousness, Mans World (1973); Dorothy, "Position Paper of a Feminist on the
Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada and the National Ad Hoc
Committee on the Status of Women" (1971), 2 New Feminist 3; Iris Marion Young,
"Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications and Feminist Critiques of Moral and
Political Theory" (1986), 5 Praxis International 381; Judy Chicago, Through the Flower
(1975). For a brief overview of the literature and practice see Miles "1.F.P." and Fireweed
"I.F.", ibid.
22. Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (1984).
23. These values frequently are contrasted with "malist" or androcentric values such as
individualism and separation, competitiveness and domination, abstraction and rationalism,
and egocentrism.
24. Jeri Dawn Wine even goes so far as to suggest that there is a commitment to non-violence.
"Gynocentric Values and Feminist Psychology" in Feminism In Canada, supra note 14, at 67;
see also Marilyn French, Beyond Power, 445 (1985); and S. Ruddick, "Preservative Love and
Military Destruction" in Mothering, supra note 18, at 231. see generally, Cynthia E. Enloe,
"Feminists Thinking about War, Militarism and Peac;e" in Analyzing Gender 526 (B. Hess and
M. Ferre eds. 1987).
25. O'Brien, "Feminism and Revolution" in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14, at 252. As
sometimes articulated, gynocentrism privileges reproduction over production, a position that is
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seeks to change the very nature and terms26 of power relations, "of what
it means to be a woman and what it means to be a man".27 By drawing
on its reservoir of transformative values, it promises to take us beyond
equality as it has been traditionally conceived, "towards a new departure
for humanity as a whole".28 It calls for a feminization of humanity and
the negation of the negation imposed by the imperialism of "male
stream" conventional wisdom.
Gynocentrism acknowledges that the achievements of equalitarianism
have been significant.29 However, it suggests that equalitarianism, on its
own, lacks an emancipatory vision, that it constructs feminism as merely
another constituency in the pluralist regime.30 Equalitarianism does not
make the fundamental challenge to man's definition and structuring of
the "prototype human being". Ultimately, its central weakness is that it
comes dangerously close to being premised on an "essentially male model
of humanity". Moreover, it runs the very real dangers of being yet
another patriarchal cul de sac,31 or assimilation.
The equalitarians are similarly perturbed by the gynocentric turn in
feminist discourse. They are seriously concerned that such an approach is
both strategically dangerous and conceptually misconceived. Gynocen
trism is perceived as dangerous in that, by seemingly accepting a moral
division of labour, it reconfirms traditional stereotypes of the feminine
woman, thereby restricting women's horizons and confining them to the
as critical of traditional Marxism as it is of liberalism. See for example Linda Nicholson,
"Feminism and Marx: Integrating Kinship with the Economic" (1986), 5 Praxis International
368; Mary O'Brien, "Reproducing Marxist Man", In The Sexism of Social and Political
Theory 107 (L. Clarke & L. Lange eds. 1979); Dorothy Smith, "The Problem of the Main
Business" (Address, Dalhousie University, 9th March 1988).
26. Betty Friedan asks "Can women, will women, even try to change the terms?" The Second
Stage 33 (1981).
27. Geraldine Finn in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14 at 303.
28. A. Miles, in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14, at 214. Marcuse, "Marxism and
Feminism" (1974), 2 Women's Studies 279, 281. But see A. Rich for a more cautious feminist
approach:
The urge to leap across feminism to "human liberation" is a tragic and dangerous
mistake.
"Toward a Woman Centred University", Lies, Secrets and Silence (1979) at 134, 11.
The concern of this paper is not to "leap across" feminism, but to inquire into the potential
of feminist reconstruction, and to raise concerns about the pervasiyeness of patriarchal
hegemony, both substantively and methodologically.
29. For a review of the success of equalitarianism in an area of sex discrimination see Herma
Hill Kay, Text, cases and materials on Sex-Based Discrimination (2d) (1981). See also W.
Chafe, Women and Equality ( 1977).
30. Angela Miles, "Ideological Hegemony in Political Discourse: Women's Specificity and
Equality" in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14, 213 at 214. Yolande Cohen, "Thoughts on
Women and Power" in Feminism in Canada, ibid 229 at 230. See also Miles, "I.F.", supra
note 21.
31. Marilyn French, Beyond Power, supra note 6.
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disempowered and deprived32 private sphere. Difference reinforces and
colludes in the continued marginalization, subordination and oppression
of women.33 .Egalitarian feminists fear that gynocentrism is conceptually
misconceived in that it simply assumes that these are women's values, an
assumption that smacks of biological reductionism. It is argued, instead,
that gender is socially constructed, that these values are not necessarily
women's but are rather those which the powerholders in society-men
have allowed or imposed upon women. We cannot know what women's
values are because they have been coerced, constrained and inhibited
from developing an autonomous culture. Gynocentrism unmasked, is
perhaps masculinist ventriloquism, or simply an inversion of an always
and already androcentric construction.
The tension �tween these two themes is deep and pervasive, resulting
in very different theories, analyses and recommendations for practice.
While the concept of equalitarianism is fairly well known and
understood (particularly by lawyers), the concept of gynocentrism will
undoubtedly appear foreign to many readers, and probably utopian. To
make the concept more accessible, I wish to adumbrate two relatively
recent developments which incorporate this perspective. The first will
almost certainly be alien to the vast majority of the legal community: the
New French Feminism, while the second has circulated more widely:
Carol Gilligan's espousal of a "different voice". The purpose of the
following discussion will be to suggest that gynocentrism can have an
existence relatively autonomous from patriarchal hegemony; that
gynocentrism does indicate the possibility of a society and legal system
different from that which currently prevails, and that that difference is
substantive.
i) Difference and Literary Criticism
a) Trespassers on the Lawns ofPatriarchy:34
The Feminist Hermeneutics ofSuspicion

32. Hannah Arendt has drawn this politico-etymological connection, The Human Condition
(1958).
33. Miles, "Feminism, Equality and Liberation" in (1985), 1 C.J.W.L. 42, 55. But neither are
the gynocentrists unaware of the danger. Thus Kristeva posits . . . "What an unbelievable force
for subversion in the modern world! And at the same time what playing with fire!", "Women's
Time" in Feminist Theory: A. Critique of Ideology, 48 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo, & B. Gelpi
eds. 1982). See also I.M. Young, "Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics" (1985), 8
Women's Studies International Forum 173, and Sheppard on the dangers and promise of
gynocentrism, supra note 14 at 220.
34. Carolyn G. Heibrun, Forward to Poetics ofGender at viii (Nancy K. Miller ed. 1986).

\.
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"It is obvious that the values of women differ very often from the values
which have been made by the other sex. Yet it is the masculine values that
prevail."
Virginia Woolf35
". . . it is not difference in itself that has been dangerous to women and
other oppressed groups, but the political uses to which the idea of
difference has been put."
Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine36

In the last fifteen years or so, various feminist scholars and activists in a
variety of disciplines and fora have begun to recognize the importance
and transformative potential of "difference". These inquiries have taken
place in intellectually diverse "disciplines" such as "psychoanalysis" and
"psychology"; 37 "Jiterature"3 8 and "linguistics", 39 "history",40
"anthropology",41 and "sociology",42 "politia,"43 and "philosophy"44 and,

-:i

35. A Room of Ones Own, 76 (1929).
36. Introduction, The Future ofDifference xxiii (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 1980).
37. Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of
Gender (1978); Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974); Dorothey Dinnerstein,
The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual A"angements of the Human Malaise (1976); Nancy
Chodorow, "Gender, Relation and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective" in The Future of
Difference, supra note 36; Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976); S.
Orbach and L. Eichenbaum, Understanding Women: A Feminist Psychoanalytic Approach
(1983).
38. Writing and Sexual Difference (E. Abel ed. 1982); The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on
Women, Literature and Theory (E. Showalter ed. 1985); Gynocritics/Gynocrituques: Feminist
Approaches to Canadian and Quebec Women Writers (Barbara Godard ed. 1987).
39. Robin Lakoff, Language and Woman'.r Place (1975); Cheris Kramarae, Women and Men
Speaking (1981); C. Kramer et al. "Perspectives on Language and Communication" (1978),
3 Signs 638; Sally McConnell Ginet, "Difference and Language: A Linguists Perspective" in
The Future ofDifference 157, supra note 36; S. McConnell Ginet et al. Women and Language
in Literature and Society (R. Borber & N. Furman eds. 1980); Language and Sex: Difference
and Dominance (B. Thome & Nancy Henley eds. 1975); Symposium (1978), 3 Signs.
40. Bernice A. Carroll, Liberating Womens History (1976); Barbara Ehrenreich and Deidre
English, For Her Own Good (1978); Gerda Lerner, The Majority Finds Its Past: Placing
Women in History (1979); Joan Kelly, Women, History and Theory (1984);'Alison Prentice et
al. Canadian Women: A History ( 1988).
41. Toward an Anthropology of Women (Rayna Rapp Reiter ed. 1975); Woman, Culture and
Society (M. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere eds. 1974).
42. Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on SocialLife and Social Science (1975).
43. Elizabeth Janeway, The Powers of the Weak (1980); Elizabeth Janeway, "Women and
the Uses of Power" in The Future of Difference, supra note 36 at 327; Ruth Messinger,
"Women in Power and Politics" in The Future of Difference, supra note 36 at 318; Alison
Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983); N. Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power:
Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism (1983); Marilyn French, Beyond Power (1985);
Kathy Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (1984); Alison McPhail et al
Women Organizing For Change ( 1988).
44. Elizabeth Wolgast, Equality and the Rights of Women (1980); Women and Values:
Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy (M. Pearsall ed. 1986); Mothering (Joyce Trebilcot
ed. 1984); Alice Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Women and Modernity (1985); M.
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the masculinist bastion par excellence, "science".45 North American legal
communities, however, have been somewhat slower to take up these
initiatives,46 and efforts to discuss legal recognition and espousal of
difference immediately conjure up legitimate concerns about the racist,
hierarchicalized dichotomy of "separate but equal" as immortalized by
Plessy v. Ferguson. 41
Still, I think it is important for lawyers, and particularly crucial for
(pro) feminist lawyers, to discuss "difference" as a useful, desirable and
possibly even essential politico-legal strategy, in achieving the ultimate
goal: real equality and choice for women. To introduce this discussion of
law and difference, it may be helpful if we trace the development of
similar discourses in another discipline where there has already been
substantial progress on such issues.
One of the most prolific and potentially fruitful developments in the
last ten years in thinking about law has been the transdisciplinary impulse
to relate law and literature. This "interpretative turn"48 is of crucial
Belenky, B. Clinchey et al., Women's Way ofKnowing (1986); Women and Moral Theory (E.
Kittay, D. Meyers eds. 1987); N. Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral
Education (1984); B. Harrison, Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics
(1985); Jean Grimshaw, Feminist Philosophers (1986); Caroline Whitbeck, "A Different
Reality: Feminist Ontology" in Beyond Domination (Carol Gould ed. 1984); Gloria Steinham,
"If Moral Decay is the Question, is a Feminist Ethic the Answer", Ms. Magazine, Sept. 1987,
57. For a particularly powerful French critique of the imbricated patriarchy of philosophy see
Michele Le Doenff, "Women and Philosophy" (1977), 17 Radical Philosophy 2.
45. S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (1986); E. Keller, Reflections on Gender
and Science (1985); "Special Issue I: Feminism, and Science" (1987), 2 Hypatia; "Special
Issue II Feminism and Science" (1988), 3 Hypatia.
46. But see Colleen Sheppard, supra note 14.
47. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For clas.5ic examples of the sexism of the separate spheres ideology
at work see, Bradwell v. Rlinois, 83 U.S. 130, 16 Wall. 141 (1873); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S., 28 S.Ct. 324 (1908); Geduldig v. Aiello, 471 U.S. 484 (1974); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981); Dothardv. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
For Canadian equivalents see, In re Mabel P. French (1905), 37 N.B.R. 359 (S.C.); Edwards
v. A.G. for Canada, [1928] S.C.R. 276; [1930] A.C. 124, [1929] 3 W.W.R. 479, [1930] 1
D.L.R. 98 (P.C.). [The Persons Case]. For further discussion of this case see M.J. Mossman,
"Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes" (Unpublished manuscript, Sept
l986); Bliss v. A.G. of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 711, 92 D.L.R. (3d)
417.
48. See Brest, "Interpretation and Interest" (1982), 34 Stan. L. Rev. 765; Fish, "Fish v. Fiss"
(1984), 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325; Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation" (1982), 34 Stan. L. Rev.
739; "Interpretation Symposium" (1985), 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. l; "Symposium: Law and
Literature" (1982), 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373; Weisberg, "A Response to Fish and White" (1984),
5 Miss. C.L. Rev. 57; White, "Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life" (1985), 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684; see also McIntosh, "Legal Hermeneutics: A
Philosophical Critique" (1982), 35 Okla. L. Rev. l; Patterson, "Interpretation in Law Toward a Reconstruction of the Current Debate" (1984), 29 Vill. L. Rev. 671; Phelps & Pitts,
"Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Hermeneutics for Legal
Interpretation" (1985), 29 St. Louis U.L.J. 353. Levinson, "On Dworkin, Kennedy, and Ely:
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significance for an understanding of law, in that one of its central
achievements has been to reject the "received hierarchy of text and
reader",49 thereby highlighting the relational nature of author-text-reader,
and inducing _the correlative awareness of the unavoidability of the
plurality of legal meanings. The interpretative turn therefore challenges,
in a fundamental way, the traditional jurisprudential dichotomization of
law as either a transcendental subject or reified object. It recognizes law
as relational, interpretable, and non-essential.
Unfortunately, as is common with jurisprudential discourse, the
openness of this interpretative turn is more apparent than real. Not only
are the law and literature debates very much the progeny of an elite and
perhaps politically irrelevant academy, they are predominantly a male
centred and male-determined debate. Put differently, despite a vibrant
and vital dynamic of feminist literary criticism and theory, gender
conscious interpretations have been muted in the legal academy.50
In this part of the article I hope to trace a pattern. I wish to briefly
discuss aspects of the more traditional feminist analyses of literature
which focus most of their efforts on demonstrating the gender bias of
most traditionally valued literature. I hope to make explicit the homology
between this enterprise and equalitarianism. On this foundation, I wish to
proceed ·to a more recent impulse in feminist literary theory, one which
can be usefully identified as a countertradition of "a different voice". In
order to partake of the flavour of this impulse it will be helpful if we
abandon the parochialism of North American inquiry, to encourage
inter-cultural exchange by outlining the work of one particularly vocal
grouping of feminist voices, what has become known as the New French
Feminisms. This critical discussion will help identify potential sources for
that different voice. The final section will attempt to articulate the
substance of that voice, thereby leading us towards an "ethic of care",
which, I suggest, tentatively leads towards a legal theory and practice that
can point towards the transcendence of our current, thanatically
determined legal system.

Decoding the Legal Past" (1984), 51 Partisan Rev. 248, 262; See Fried, "Sonnet LXV and the
"Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention" (1987), 100 Harv. L. Rev. 751; Posner, "Law and
Literature" (1986), 72 Va. L. Rev. 1351; Christopher Norris, "Law, Reconstruction and the
Resistance to Theory" (1988), 15 Journal of Law and Society 166.
49. Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics 25 (1986).
50. An obvious and urgent question is "Why?". Clearly such a question goes beyond the
narrow confines of this paper but I would suggest that the reason is not because feminists do
not wish to participate in the interpretative tum, rather it is because the academy - be it
literary, legal or even left - views feminism with a seige mentality, as a threat to the cosy
comfort of the intellectual old boys club.
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The Feminist Equalitarian Critiljue ofLiterary Criticism
In 1981, Elaine Showalter posited that it was possible to identify two
modes of feminist criticism. The first she identified as "the feminist
critique" claiming that,
it is concerned with feminist as reader, and it offers feminist readings of
texts which consider the images and stereotypes of women in literature,
the omissions and misconceptions about women in criticism, and women
as signs in semiotic systems.51
Showalter identified the second mode as "gynocriticism" which
emphasizes
the study of women as writers, and its subjects are the history, styles,
themes, genres and structures of writing by women; the psychodynamics
of female creativity, the trajectory of the individual or collective female
career and the evolution and laws of a female literary tradition.52
My suggestion is that "the feminist critique" homologizes with
equalitarianism, while "gynocriticism" parallels "difference".
It will be helpful if we articulate the basic project of "the feminist
critique" in a little more detail. On a general level, feminist critics have
identified language as "a", perhaps· "the", central cultural phenomenon
which constructs our understanding of the world and our mutual
interaction. Words are neither essential nor transcendental, they are
socially constructed.53 Recognizing its inherently socialized and
socializing potential, feminists have posited that language is a major
component in the continued existence of sexism and patriarchy.54 More
specifically, by connecting text with context, feminist critics claim that
gender and literature are inextricably intertwined, that gender-related
factors are systemic and pervasive in the creation, dissemination and
consumption of any literary work. Feminist criticism identifies the sexism
of textual politics. Having identified these concerns, feminist critics claim
that the impact of this gender encoding upon the reader is large, that it
contributes in a significant way to the structuring of a reader's
understanding and acceptance of social relations. Language imposes
men's meaning upon women.

51. "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness" (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry 179, 182.
52. Ibid at 184-185. Invoking the empowering dynamic of naming, Showalter continues, "no
English term exists for such a specializ.ed critical discourse and so I have invented the term
"gynocritics".
53. For similar arguments from a neo-Marxist perspective see Culture, Media, Language
(Stuart-Hall et al. eds. 1980).
54. Sheila Rowbotham, Women's Consciousness, Man's World 32-33 (1973); Dale Spender,
Man Made Language (1980).
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The oppositional activities mobilised by such a critique range from the
"obvious" - which had not been so obvious until the critique was made
- to the subtle. Feminist critics draw attention to the unjustifiable
preponderance of male authors in academic syllabi. They relate this bias
to a patriarchal educational system which systematically undervalues and
ignores women's literary contributions because of its deeply entrenched
premise that "artistic creativity is a fundamentally male quality".55 By
interpreting through a "hermeneutics of suspicion"56 feminists unmask
and criticize the sexism and misogyny of cultural texts from Petrarch to
Shakespeare, from classical mythology to the Bible - both the Old
Testament and the New, - from Chaucer to Milton, from fairy tales to
pornography, from D.H. Lawrence to Norman Mailer.57 They argue that
the use of the generic "he" universalizes maleness, reinforces
androcentricity as the benchmark of existence, and erradicates women's
undeniable contribution to society. They object strongly to female
stereotyping inculcated via "images of women" which are constructed in
literature, thereby providing a severely constrained panorama of role
models for women.58 One aspect of the critical project is consciousness
raising, to help the reader become a "resisting reader",59 to be aware of
the ideological fallout of uncritically absorbing such texts.60 In brief,
feminist critics unpack the sexual politics of the aesthetic.
The parallels with equalitarianism in other fields are obvious. The
basic criticism is that women have been excluded, perhaps intentionally,61
and that the enforced silence has been an important aspect in the
continuing subordination and inequality of women in society. The
critique is levelled against the exclusion with its correlative detrimental
impact upon women, but as call for action it articulates little more than
a demand for access and inclusion,62 a fair kick at the literary-linguistic
can. "Feminist theorists seek equality and bolster their demands with

55. S. Gilbert and S. Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic (1979).
56. E. Showalter, "Towards a Feminist Poetics" in Women Writing and Writing About
Women, 22 (M. Jacobus ed. 1979). Showalter adopts this phrase from Paul Ricouer, Freud
and Philosophy, 32-36 (1970).
57. See for example, Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (1970); Katherine M. Rogers, The
Troublesome Helpmate (1986); Elizabeth Meese, Crossing The Double Cross 9 (1987).
58. Mary Ellman, "Feminine Stereotypes" in Thinking About Women (1968); Susan
Kippelman Cornillon, Images of Women in Fiction (1972).
59. Judith Fetterley, The Resisting Reader (1978).
60. Annette Kolodny, "Dancing Through the Minefield . . ." (1980), 6 Feminist Studies I.
61. "Women writers were not haphazardly 'forgotten' but deliberately buried", Annis Pratt,
''The New Feminist Criticism" (1970-71), 32 College English 872.
62. Annette Kolodny, "Some notes on defining a feminist literary criticism" (1975-76), 2
Critical Inquiry 75.
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claims of similarity."63 This type of feminist criticism and rev1s10n is
important in that it explodes the liberal myths of cultural pluralism and
openness to reveal that our literary-linguistic geneology has been truly
history thereby excluding women's heritage.64
However, it soon becomes apparent that this negative critique, the
unearthing of the archaeology of women's silence, although necessary
and certainly beneficial, is by no means a sufficient foundation for fully
articulating women's contributions - past and present - to literature.
The feminist effort to revise the male bias inherent in the evolution of
literary merit leaves too much of the methodological, if not the
substantive, androcentric structure intact. As Showalter pithily posits:
the feminist obsession with correcting, modifying supplementing, revising,
humanizing . or even attacking male critical theory keeps us· dependent
upon it and retards our progress in resolving our own theoretical
problems.65

Feminist criticism continues to work within the masculinist paradigm,
it does not challenge the paradigm itself in any fundamental way. It is
partial rather than total criticism of the "economy of sameness".66 The
most obvious example of its limitations is that its analyses are primarily
concerned with male texts.
In the light of these limitations, Showalter calls for a "feminist criticism
that is genuinely women centred, independent and intellectually
coherent. It must find its own subject, its own system, its own theory, its
own voice . . . we must choose to have the argument out at last on our
own premises."67 This she names "gynocriticism" and emphasizes that its
fundamental question is "what is the difference of women's writing"?68
The most important shift envisioned by this proposal is that the data
base be primarily women's texts, not those of men.69 The potentially
63. Elizabeth Abel, Introduction (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry I 73.
64. For a less than sympathetic male response which seeks to accommodate feminist criticism
by reducing it to just another constituency in the cacophany of literary critical voices, see K.K.
Ruthven, Feminist Literary Studies (1984).
65. Showalter, supra, note 51, at 183.
66. Meese, supra note 57, at 17.
67. Showalter, supra note 51, at 184.
68. Ibid., at 185.
69. Not surprisingly, the primary emphases have been on the texts of white women, first world
women, heterosexual women. Little was said at the time about lesbian or black women's
literature or criticism. In recent years intra gender differences have begun to be articulated, and
not always without pain and mutual criticism. See, e.g., A. Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality
and Lesbian Existence" (1980), 5 Signs 631, On Lies, Secrets and Silences (1979); B.
Zimmerman, "What has never been: an overview of lesbian feminist literary criticism" (1981),
7 Feminist Studies 451; Barbara Smith, Towards a Black Feminist Criticism (1980). For more
general· discussions of the occlusion of different women see: Marilyn Frye, The Politics of
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radical correlative of this "search for a muted female culture"70 is that it
provides the opportunity for an autonomous and distinctive feminist
critical theory and practice of writing. Moreover, it opens up space for
something more than negative critique, in so far as it reveals a sustained
and ingenious feminist resiliance to what had, at first blush, appeared to
be a totalizing masculinist ·hegemony. The necessary critique clears the
way for the reconstruction and affirmation of a tradition "of expressivity
outside the dominant discourse" that not only can be recognized and
redeemed, but also expanded.
Showalter's call was less an exhortation to commence a new
endeavour than an articulation of what had already been intersticially
underway in the anglophone feminist literary circles for the preceding
several years. Several . North American books and articles had been
published which, despite important differences, had sought to identify
both the existence of an extensive women's literature and the ways in
which women's writing had been different.71 They also began to inquire
as to whether gender had been a determining factor in that difference.72
However, in general, these anglophone efforts did not identify as their
central concern the pivotal question of why women's writing was, and
continues to be, different. Their discussions were diverse rather than
central, in part because their tradition of North American empiricism left
little space for more sustained reflection.
In the last five years or so, it may be possible to detect yet another shift
in emphasis, or at least direction, in anglophone feminist literary thought.
Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (1983); Bell Hooks, Ain't I a Woman Too: Black Women
and Feminism (1981), Feminist Theory: from Margin to Center (1984); Gloria Joseph, "The
Incompatible Menage a Trois: Marxism, Feminism and Racism", in Women and Revolution,
91-107 (L. Sargent ed. 1981); Audre Lorde, "An Open Letter to Mary Daly", in This Bridge
Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, 94-97 (Cherri Moraga and Gloria
Anzaldua eds. 1 981); Maria C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman, "Have We Got a Theory
for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for the Woman's Voice"
(1983), 6 Hypatia Women's Studies International Forum 6, at 578-81; Elizabeth Spelman,
"Theories of Race and Gender: The Erasure of Black Women" (1980-82), 5 Quest 4, 36-62.
70. Moi supra note 2 at 76.
71. See for example, The (M)other Tongue: Essays in Feminist Psychoanalytic Interpretation
22-23 (Shirley Nelson Gardiner et al. eds. 1985).
72. See for example, P�tricia Meyer Spacks, The Female Imagination (1975); Ellen Moers,
Literary Women (1976); Elaine Showalter, A Literature of their Own (1977); Nina Baym,
Woman's Fiction (1978); Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic
(1979), Margaret Homans, Women Writers and Poetic lndentity (1980); Annette Kolodny,
"Some Notes on Defining a 'feminist literary criticism"' (1975-76), 2 Critical Inquiry 75;
Robin Lakoff, Language and Woman's Place (1975). For a useful review of some of these
important texts see Tori) Moi, supra, note 2, Ch. 3 and 4. Indeed, as early as 1923 Virginia
Woolf had suggested the possibility of such a distinctive mode of writing in her references to
"a woman's sentence" in "Romance and the Heart", Contemporary Writers 124 (1965).
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There now appear to be several serious North American attempts to
suggest explanations as to why women might speak and write differently
from men, in The (M)other Tongue. 73 This relocation of emphasis is
inspired by the desire to challenge the androcentric literary paradigm, to
critique its unidimensionalism and exclusivity, and to -give original value
to that which has been traditionally devalued by the masculinist
gatekeepers of the literary establishment.74
However, the main impulse underlying this differential enterprise has
not been indigeneously anglophone. Rather, it has been inspired by a
group of women scholars working, for the most part in France, to
articulate, justify and valorize the importance of "difference". Their
contribution is both intriguing and politically crucial so it may be useful
if we partalce of a "French detour" in order to develop a critical
awareness of the origins, development and impact of difference.
b) The Cartographies ofSilence:75
i) New French Feminisms:16 Difference Developed· The Sources of the

Different Voice

The limits of my language means the limits of my world.77
To imagine a language, means to imagine a form oflife.78
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Like their Anglo-American counterparts, the primary concern of the
New French Feminists (N.F.F.) is to inquire into the nature and relations
of language, power and gender. They also identify and critique the
historical exclusion of women from culturally valued discourse and
writing as a central component in the oppression and repression of
women by phallocratic79 societies. Where the N.F.F. come into their own,
73. The (M)other Tongue, supra note 71. See, also, Writing and Sexual Difference (Elizabeth
Abel ed. 1982); The Poetics of Gender (Nancy K. Miller ed. 1986).
74. See for example Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and its Discontents: Language,
Power and Meaning" (1981-82), 7 Signs 603.
75. A. Rich, The Dream ofa Common Language (1978).
76. For useful introductions to the New French Feminists, See Elaine Showalter, "Feminist
Criticism in the Wilderness" (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry 179; Ann Rosalind Jones, "Writing the
Body: Toward an Understanding of L'Ecriture Feminine" (1981), 7 Feminist Studies 247;
Elaine Marks, "Women and Literature in France" (1978), 3 Signs 832; Carolyn Greenstein
Burke, "A Report from Paris: Women's Writing and the Women's Movement" (1977-78), 3
Signs 843.
77. Cited in K.K. Ruthven, Feminist Literary Studies 59 (1984).
78. Philosophicallnvestigationspara. 19, 53 (1958).
79. French feminists frequently refer to the prefix "phal" in order to identify the inherent
maleness of so much of contemporary knowledge, social structures, and social activities. This
term has also begun to infiltrate jurisprudential discourse, see e.g. Christine Littleton,
"Reconstructing Sexual Equality" (1987), 75 Cal. L.Rev. 1279.
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however, is their adamant insistence that the reason for this systemic
silencing and enforced absence has been the masculinist refusal to
recognize women's specificity, women's difference. They advocate that
the effective vocalization and inscription of such difference would
seriously threaten the monologic, phallus-identity fundamental to
mankind's domination of others, including women and nature. The
N.F.F.'s attempt to challenge this androcentric colonialism by being
positive, by tentatively creating, locating, and valorizing alternative,
specifically feminist, languages and literature - what they call parole
feminine, l'ecriture feminine. 80 Thus, the central concern for the N.F.F. is
not feminism and equality, but feminism and difference and their
mutually constitutive relationship.
The historical origins of the N.F.F. can, roughly, be traced back to the
psuedo-revolutionary days of May 1968, and the subsequent realization
that the radical men of the New Left were just as patriarchal, sexist and
intolerant of gender issues as their bourgeois forefathers and brothers. In
response, the Mo uvement de Liberation des Femmes (M.L.F.)81 sought to
develop its own distinct agendas, agendas that were responsive to the
concerns and needs of women. Their activities have ranged from
consciousness raising groups to intentionally polemical political action,
from the creation of alternative discursive fora to the establishment of
non-co-optable journals and even an independent publishing house.
Their underlying motivation has been to identify and challenge the deep
structural sexism of contemporary French culture, what they called
"everyday sexism".82
The intellectual geneologies of the N.F.F. are extremely diverse,
including biology, linguistics, neo-Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis,
social contructionism, structuralism, Derridean deconstruction, and neo
Marxism. Predictably, but unfortunately, because of this genealogical
prehistory much of the N.F.F. is, at best, unfamiliar and demanding and,
at worst, inaccessible to the uninitiated.83 But difficulty, as Colin McCabe
80. It should go without saying that not all French feminists agree with the N.F.F. analysis,
assessment, critique and program. Others, including de Beauvior, have voiced serious concerns
about the dangers in espousing difference. See also Monique Wittig, The Guerillas ( 1 973)
trans. David LeVay. For useful North American introductions to this opposition to N.F.F. See
H.V. Wenzal "The Text as Body Politics" (1981), 7 Feminist Studies 264; Ann R. Jones,
"Writing the Body" (1981), 7 Feminist Studies 247.
8 1 . The M.L.F. was not an organization, but rather an amalgam of diverse radical women's
groups, including "Politique et psychanalyse" and "Feministes revolutionaires". For a fuller
discussion of the troubled history of the M.L.F. see Toril Moi, "Introduction" French Feminist
Thought (1987); Claire Duchen, Feminism in France (1986).
82. This historical account draws heavily on marks and de Courtivron, The New French
Feminisms ( 1 980), Introduction III, and Duchen supra note 8 1 .
83. Marks, supra, note 76, at 833.
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points out, "is an ideological notion . . . (because) within our ascriptions
of difficulty lie subterranean and complex evaluations".84 Difficulty is
integrally connected with unfamiliarity, lack of experience. But these
"circumstances of ignorance" are not fixed, essential or fortuitous. They
are not very much the outcome of social structures that have been chosen
and perpetuated by those with the power to construct and constrain our
cultural milieu and experiences. Thus, those who aspire to be progressive
should be suspicious about the familiar and the facile and, at least, be
open-minded about the unfamiliar and the difficult. More importantly,
difficulty is inevitable in that in attempting to achieve what the N.F.F.
aspires to - articulating that which has never been articulated - is, of
necessity, unfamiliar. It is a new language.
The New. French Feminisms have gone beyond a programme of
critique, of unmasking sexism and stereotyping - both explicit and
implicit - of unpacking the omissions and misconceptions in traditional
literature. Although beneficial and necessary, such consciousness-raising
strategies are perceived as inadequate by many french feminists. At best,
they may push for a reformist equality, an equality that runs the risk of
simply smoothing the sharp edges of misogyny, sandpapering the
extremities and thereby permitting, indeed perhaps even reinforcing, the
continued existence of the basic structures of masculinist hegemony.
Instead, the N.F.F. propose and proceed immediately with their vision:
to directly undercut traditional textual conventions through the
subversive tactics of appropriating and revising women's texts, styles and
themes, and by articulating the traditional muteness of difference. The
N.F.F. seek to elucidate the distinctiveness of women's language "in
contrast, not relation, to the dominant conventions".85 They seek to
present a new, alternative, gender-specific vantage point (episteme)
independent and subversive of, and different from, the currently
prevailing phallocentric paradigm. ". . . • L'ecriture feminine . . . reasserts
the value of the feminine and identifies the theoretical project of feminist
criticism as the analysis of difference."86 Central to this project of
articulating and valorizing difference has been their eulogy and
reappropriation of "la jouissance",87 women's pleasure, the libidinal
84. Preface, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, In Other Worlds (1987).
85. Elizabeth Abel, Introduction, "Writing and Sexual Difference" (1981), 8 Critical Inquiry
173, 177.
86. Elaine Showalter, supra note 51, at 186.
87. "Jouissance" is one of the central terms of French feminist literary discourses. There does
not exist a suitable English language equivalent for this experience. Reflecting the importance
of the power of naming, this bas now become a neologism in certain North American feminist
circles. Marks and de Courtivron interpret it as follows:
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economy of women. Difference and la jouissance, they suggest, have the
power to de-range and de-centre the "reigning phallus".88
Leading names within this gynocritical dynamic include Helene
Cixous,89 Julia Kristeva,90 and Luce Irigaray,91 and their texts have been
energizing catalysts for a host of others.92
ii) Helene Cixous
Cixous is profoundly skeptical of equalitarianism suggesting that it is a
bourgeois feminist effort to gain legitimacy within a patriarchal society.
The verb jouir ("to enjoy, to experience sexual pleasure") and the substantive la
jouissance ("sexual pleasure, bliss, rapture") occur frequently in the texts of the new
French feminisms . . . . This pleasure, when attributed to a woman, is considered to be
a different order from the pleasure that is represented within the male libidinal economy
often described in terms of the capitalist gain and profit motive. Women's jouissance
carries with it the notion of fluidity, diffusion, duration. It is a kind of potlatch in the
world of orgasms, a giving, expending, dispensing of pleasure without concern about
ends or closure. One can easily see how the same imagery could be used to describe
women's writing.
Supra, note 82 at 36-37.
Marilyn French has adopted this idea, but has anglicized it to render it a "pleasure
principle", a counterparadigm to the patriarchal dynamic towards power and domination, an
ethical standard which can provide guidance and encouragement in the project of "feminizing
the world". Beyond Power supra note 7, Chs. 6 and 7.
88. Elaine Marks and I. de Courtivron, supra note 82 at 36.
89. Helene Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa" (1975-76), 1 Signs 875; Portrait de Dora
( 1986); Angst ( 1977) (Trans 1 985).
90. Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (1984) (Margaret Waller trans.); About
Chinese Women (1977) (Anita Burrows trans.): Powers of Ho"or (1932), (Leon Roudiez
trans.); Poly/ogue (1977); Desire in Language (Leon Roudiez ed. 1980); The Kristeva Reader
(Tori! Moi ed. 1986).
91. Luce Irigaray, Speculum: de /'autre femme ( 197 4) (Gillian C. Gill trans. Speculum: Of the
Other Woman (1985); Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (1977) (Catherine Porter trans., This Sex
Which is Not One (1985)); Amante Marine: De Friedrich Neitzche (1980). In this paper I do
not discuss the contribution of Luce Irigaray. Drawing on post-Lacanian psychological theory
and deconstruction, Irigaray argues that, traditionally, women have been culturally understood
as the "other" of man, as lack, deficiency, incompleteless and, ultimately, as his inferior. Thus,
she argues that womens oppression/repression is not simply political or economic, rather it is
imbricated in our very understanding and knowledge of the world.
Her affirmative practice is to suggest, inchoately, a conception of woman as she might exist
beyond masculine representations of her. I say "inchoately" because to identify woman via a
male constructed language would be to represent her, but once again only within the discourse
of male theory. lrigaray therefore prefers the gaps, the silences, the blanks in order to indicate
but not to define. However, when lrigaray does move beyond refusal and invocation of the
blank spaces, she also draws on maternal and reproductive metaphors, as well as female
sexuality. See for example "When Our Lips Speak Together" (1980), 6 Signs 69.
92. See Elaine Marks, supra, note 76 at 838-840. It should also be pointed out that each of
these women insist that their projects are diverse from the others, that their work is not an
integrated vanguard. Indeed, there are, perhaps fundamental, political differences between
them.
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Her ambition is the transformation of patriarchal society, to reconstruct
it upon a more heterogeneous basis, a society underpinned by a feminine
multiplicity, a substantively different, matrifocal and alterior society.
The central concern of Cixous' work is the connection between
women's writing and women's body.93 By articulating and developing
this connection, Cixous attempts, through a metaphorical discourse, to
envision a less dichotomized, mutually alienating conjuncture of social
relations. Her enterprise is to imagine and evoke both the means and the
possible nature of a society liberated from phallocratic domination. In
pursuit of this end, she quests for transformed language and literature.
Cixous' work is remarkably evocative, imaginative and suggestive,
both in form and substance.94 On occasion, she indicates that the actual
biological se� of the author is irrelevant, that difference is to be located
in the writing itself.95 However, her most significant work challenges the
masculine tradition of father as creator by locating the source of
difference in women's bodies, thereby emphasizing "the voice of milk
and blood".96 Through euphoric "verbal rhapsody"97 she envisons the
female body as plenitude, as capable of a plethora of procreative
capabilities: gestation, birth, lactation, writing.
She is giving birth, with the strength of a lioness. Of a plant. Of a
cosmogony. Of a woman . . . A desire for text! Confusion! What possesses
her? A child! Paper! Intoxications. I'm overflowing! My breasts overflow!
Milk. Ink. The moment of suckling. And I? I too am hungry. The taste of
milk, of ink!98

The richness of these maternal metaphors, while themselves pregnant,
are also a source of dilemma. Despite her apparent rejection of
reductionist biologism and essentialism on a theoretical level, Cixous
seemingly buys into these understandings in the course of her own,
intentionally inspirational, literary practice, thereby problematically
reducing ''jouissance" to either women's reproductive opportunity or
their sexuality, a pleasure principle equally and exclusively accessible to
93. See for example La venue a /'ecriture ( I 977).
94. Form is just as important as substance, and the work of activists like Cixous is pervaded
by openness, non-linearity, fluidity, polysemicism, disconnection.
95. See Moi, supra note 2 at 108. For example, at one point she indicates that Jean Genet's
work indicates traits of "feminite". See "Laugh" supra note 89 at 855.
96. Sandra Gilbert, "A Tarantella of Theory" Introduction, The Newly Born Woman; (1986)
(Betsy Wing trans.).
97. Domna N. Stanton, "Difference on Trial" in The Poetics of Gender, supra note 34 at 169.
98. In La venue a l'ecriture 37 (1977). For similar invocations of the "white ink of mothers
milk" see "Laugh" supra note 89. At times, Adrienne Rich also appears to accept that women's
difference is related to their biological capabilities. See for example Of Woman Born 1 1, 62
(1977).
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all women. Her political strategy for the empowerment of women leads
her onto the treacherous ledge of the transcendental, metaphysical
"universal woman subject",99 the mythical earth-mother, and perhaps
back to the masculinist and/or conservative identification of woman with
nature, only now it is "anatomy is textuality". 100
Moreover, despite, or perhaps because of, her metaphorical101 and
"utopian" 102 predelictions and her over-emphasis on the maternal
location, Cixous never provides her audience with an account of the
substance of difference. Indeed, on the contrary, in her celebrated
(wo)manifesto "Laugh of the Medusa", she goes so far as to deny the
possibility of defining the feminist practice of writing:
For this practice can never be theorized, enclosed, encoded - which
doesn't mean that it 9oesn't exist. But it will always surpass the discourse
that regulates the phallocentric system; it does and will take place in areas
other than those subordinated to philosophico-theoretical domination.103

Thus, although Cixous goes beyond critique, her affirmative program
remains disconcertingly indeterminate, disturbingly essentialist and
tantalizingly suggestive, but ultimately underdeveloped to serve as an
empowering, transformative strategy. Something more specific, although
necessarily corrigible, is required.
iii) Julia Kristeva
Julia Kristeva's work, although in certain ways significantly different
from that of Cixous, also manifests some problems. She is explicit in her
anti-biologism and anti-essentialism in so far as she argues that femininity
is not necessarily related to sex, but is better understood in relation to
marginality. Thus, femininity is understood in a relational rather than in
an essentialist sense "as that which is marginalized by the patriarchal
symbolic order".104 Developing her ideas through a fusion of pre-oedipal
99. "Laugh" supra note 89 at 878.
100. Showalter, "Wilderness" supra note 51, at 187. For a French Canadian example see
Jovette Marchessault, Lesbian Triptych (1985). The idea of the "Celtic Triptych" in Part A of
this article was inspired, in part, by this book.
101. The point about metaphor is important. In "Laugh of the Medusa" supra note 89 at 881
she suggests that the invocation of "mother" is metaphorical and symbolic-inspirational, not
biologically determined. However, when reading her texts I get the impression of a greater faith
in the idea than merely the instrumental utilization of a concept for strategic purposes. For an
alternative critique of the maternal metaphor which argues that revalorization through
mimeticism remains within sameness, see Domna N. Stanton, "Difference on Trial" in Poetics
of Gender supra note 34 at 170-173.
102. Moi, supra note 2 at 121-124.
103. Marks and de Courtivron, supra note 82 at 253.
104. Moi, supra note 2 at 166.
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interpretations of mother-child interaction and semiotic theory, 105 she
develops an interpretation that allows her to posit that men can also be
"different" in so far as the patriarchal symbolic order considers them as
marginal. Thus, she discusses the subversive difference of avant garde
artists such as Joyce, Artaud, and Mallarme. However, she is still very
much a proponent of difference:
Woman is here to shake up, to disturb, to deflate masculine values, and
not to espouse them. Her role is to maintain differences by pointing to
them, by giving them life, by putting them into play against one another. 106

Although Kristeva is keen to "remind us that any hope for a radically
new ethics may be up to women",107 she refuses to conjecture about the
"female subject's potential liberation from patriarchy",108 claiming only
that the feminist project is one of critique and negation, subversion and
dissidence. This becomes most apparent in her On Chinese Women when
she opines:
On a deeper level [than advertisements or slogans for women's demands],
however, a woman cannot "be"; it is something which does not even
belong in the order of being. It follows that a feminist practice can only be
negative, at odds with what already exists. . . . In "woman" I see
something that cannot be represented, something above and beyond
nomenclatures and ideologies. 109

Kristeva also directly confronts the question of ethics. In Revolution in
Poetic Language she develops her negative vision of political praxis even
more explicitly. She claims that radical practice must take the stance that:
wherever a code (mores, social contract) [emerges it] must be shattered in
order to give way to the free play of negativity, need, desire, pleasure and
jouissance, before being put together again, although temporarily and with
full knowledge of what is involved. 110

And again she argues that women's strategy should be to assume:
a negative function: reject everything finite, definite, structured, loaded
with meaning, in the existing state of society. Such an attitude puts women
on the side of the explosion of social codes: with revolutionary
movements. 1 1 1

105. Revolution, supra note 90.
106. Polylogue, supra note 90 at 498.
107. Alice Jardine, Introduction to "Womans Time" (1981), 7 Signs 5, 12.
108. Jardine, "Opaque Texts and Transparent Contexts" in Poetics of Gender, supra note 34,
at 110.
109. On Chinese Women, supra note 90 at 137.
110. Cited in Jardine, "Opaque Texts and Transparent Contexts" in Poetics of Gender, supra
note 34, 96 at 109.
111. Marks and de Courtivron, supra note 82, at 166.
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Thus, by continually insisting "that a feminist praxis can only be negative;
an opposition to what exists, in order to say that's not it . . . that's still not
it"112, Kristeva's is an ethics of subversion, a negative ethics, one that
seeks to critique, but one that provides little guidance for reconstruction.
Although it would be inappropriate to accuse her of nihilism, as an
empowering political strategy, her preference for "eternal dissiden(ce)" is
only of limited utility.
iv) The Significance ofthe N.F.F.
There is much to be said for the N.F.F. examination, reappropriation and
affirmation of the specificity and difference of female experiences and
body. Their inquiry highlights, in a crucial way, both the existence and
importance of heterogeneity, and the potential not only for different ways
of writing but also different social relations premised upon different value
structures. Seen in this light, it must be admitted that their efforts have
been successful in so far as they have gone a long way towards speaking
"(m)otherwise", while being imprisoned within a discursive structure not
only alien, but actively hostile, to the articulation of that which they want
to say.
However, unfortunately, in their attempts to unbury the repressed
maternal, some N.F.F.'s come dangerously close to the simultaneously
authoritarian and crippling impulses of essentialism, 113 the universal and
exclusive, anatomically-based identity and experience of women as
women. They suggest, both explicitly and metaphorically, that women's
writing "springs from a secret well of immanent femininity". 114 In so
doing, they deny the qualitatively different experiences of different
women in favour of some putative metaphysical woman's essence. Such
essentialism is uncomfortably silent about differences of class, race, sexual
orientation, 1 15 and physical or psychological ability. Although the same
criticism cannot apply to Kristeva, she fails to capitalize on her own
critical insights and unfortunately retreats into negation with its
potentially paralysing political consequences.
Despite these rather serious difficulties, the N.F.F.'s contribution is
important. As Spivak points out, within their inquiry there is "an implicit
double program for women . . . against sexism, where women unite as a
. biologically oppressed caste; and for feminism, where hwnan beings train

112.
113.
114.
115.

Ibid. at 137.
Spivak, "Feminism and Critical Theory", supra, note 84; Unger, Politics, (1987).
Jane Gallop, "Writing a letter with Vermeer" in Poetics of Gender, supra, note 34 at 150.
Annie Leclerc, "La lettre d'amour" in La venue a l'ecriture (1977).
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to prepare for a transformation of consciousness"116 and, I would add, the
practice of our social relations. This double · vision is potentially
empowering for it attempts to shift the focus of attention from negation
to affirmation, while simultaneously remaining acutely conscious of the
masculinist powers and structures that be, with their potential for both
repressive imperialism and more subtle forms of delegitimation such as
ridiculing feminist utopianism. The double vision is an encouraging
attempt to develop the ground between self-defeating reformism and
mythical revolution by exploring the transformative potential of
language. It encourages the articulation and espousal of difference, but
now it is an awareness of difference in all its social, political, historical
and cultural contexts; difference as heterogeneity rather than
determinative polarities.
Thus, despite serious and politically important differences, the N.F.F.
are unambiguous in their belief that difference and otherness are of
fundamental significance. At the same time, there has been an
unwillingness and inability to provide an explicit content for that
otherness. The reason for this is not difficult to locate; Men have
monopolized the discourse and the words do not, as yet, exist. To say and
write what needs to be said and written can, as yet, only be done through
discourses and texts which are an anathema to that otherness. The
contradiction is stark. Moreover, even if women could articulate a
substance for otherness, they do not control the discursive means of
production and reception and therefore to even speak or write runs the
risk of co-option and appropriation. The French feminist response has
been one of using the silences, the gaps, the margins, the spaces, in the
hope that they can, even indirectly, communicate something of the
significance of otherness. Although cautiously radical, I think that, on the
continuum between negation and reconstruction, such tactics are situated
a little too closely to the position of negation.
ii) Feminist Psychoanalytic Theory and a Different Jurisprudence
a) Making it "Otherwise"
". . . women's development delineates a path not only to a less violent life
but also to a maturity realized through interdependence of taking care."
Carol Gilligan117

The transdisciplinary interpretive turn and French detour indicate that
there is merit in looking beyond the imprisoning confines of traditional
1 16. Spivak, "French Feminism in an International Frame" supra, note 84 at 145 and 150.
1 17. In a Different Voice, 172 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Voice].

Devlin: Transformation or Resistance

1 49

North American legal discourse. The inquiry demonstrates that our
formative contexts - intellectual, disciplinary, national and cultural while constitutive may also be constraining. As lawyers we tend to
understand social relations through a particularistic grid, but others may
understand those same social relations through an alternative grid. The
expansion of our cognitive juridical horizons so as to encompass how
others experience and interpret social interaction can provide us with an
opportunity to reflect upon our own deep structural assumptions, to ask
new and different questions about the nature of law, and to contemplate
alternative visions of law, and perhaps society more generally. To simply
dismiss other viewpoints as utopian or naive is to uncritically buy into
phallocracy, perhaps even reinforcing that which one hopes to transform.
For feminism, knowledge itself is a crucial arena for critique and
reconstruction.
We can continue feminism's context dislocating and repositioning
approach by returning to North America, but by now focusing on some
recent psychological theory as developed by feminist scholar, Carol
Gilligan. The virtue of Gilligan's approach is that while it advocates both
the existence and desirability of difference, it also attempts, in a tentative
way, to articulate what difference might mean, what is substantively
different about difference. In other words, it cautiously attempts to
identify some of the central components of the notoriously ambiguous
and multivalented concept of difference.
Gilligan's reflections on difference grow out of her ability to listen.
When many of us listen we interpret what the other is saying in
accordance with a plethora of assumptions, apparent truths, preconcep
tions. Consequently, when tbe other speaks, their discourse is not
understood to have any essential meaning, but rather is encoded so as to
"fit" with the interpretive matrix which pre-exists their discourse. If a
discourse does not fit this pre-existing structure, it is understood as
anomalous or, perhaps more accurately, as deviant, inferior, even
senseless. Thus, the determining structure of discourse is simultaneously
communication-enhancing and communication-exclusive, it is both
facilitative and intolerant.
The starting point for Gilligan's work has been her ability to
temporarily and partially suspend her socially constructed commitment
to the conventional matrix of communicative assumptions and thereby to
pick up on the "moral language which spontaneously appeared in
women's narratives". 118 Her suggestion is that the moral discourse of
118. I. Marcus and P. Spielgelman, "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A
Conversation" (1985), 34 Buffalo L.Rev. 11 at 37 [hereinafter cited as Discourse].
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women is "bilingual'\ More ambitiously, she has begun to develop a
countervailing interpretive matrix which allows for the recognition of
alternative discourses, those which were formerly understood to be
anomalous, deviant and inferior. Every decoding is itself an encoding,
and Gilligan identifies the different voice as the feminine voice. 119 This
alternative matrix not only allows for recognition of that which had been
traditionally excluded, but also validates, legitimates and affirms the
integrity of that which it identifies. 120 It valorizes that which has been
devalued, and reconstructs our understanding of "difference" to accept it
as positive not negative, and perhaps even to encourage us to embrace it.
. Gilligan's insights stem from her studies of the discourse of women
who are confronted with moral choices which necessitate an evaluation
of the relationship between self and other. Her basic claim is that the
hierarchicalized stages of moral development created by Kohlberg et
al. 121 are unjustifiably partisan in that they value certain types of moral
decision-making over others, without seriously considering the merits of
the alternatives. What is particularly problematic for Gilligan is that the
other mode of moral decision-making, prima facie, appears to correlate
more closely with the way women make moral choices. Rephrased,
according to Kohlbergian assumptions and criteria of evaluation,
women's moral decision-making patterns are less advanced - read
inferior - than those of men. 122 Moreover, the disconnection between
that which is publicly valued and that which better encapsulates the
different moral worldview of some women, causes those women a
significant degree of personal anguish and pain. 123 One important
politico-cognitive consequence of Gilligan's work is that what had
seemed to be scientifically neutral and objective, a structure of moral
development, can now be understood to be premised upon, determined
by and permeated through and through, with an androcentric bias.
Gilligan's enterprise is an important feminist challenge to the fathers of
119. Voice., 105. More recently, Gilligan has pointed out that "I deliberately called it a
different voice, I did not call it a woman's voice." A few lines later she says that her project
was not to compare women with men, but to "compare ·women with theory". "Discourse" at
38. This is important in that the analysis is not on the basis of sex, but on the basis of the
evaluative and cognitive structures that underpin and channel our interaction.
120. Voice, at 3.
121. Kohlberg et al., Essays in Moral Development: Vol 1: The Philosophy of Moral
Development: Moral Stages and the Ideal of Justice (1981); Vol 2: The Psychology of Moral
Development: The Nature of Validity ofMoral Stages (1986).
122. Similar processes of marginafuation and devaluation of women permeate Freud's work.
See for example his claim that women are "a dark continent for psychology". "The Question
of Lay Analysis", Vol. XX Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 216 (Stratchey
ed. 1961).
123. Voice, at 71.
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psychological, scientific orthodoxy, from Freud to Piaget, from Erikson
to Kohlberg.
Gilligan's work, however, is more than simply a psychological version
of the equalitarian critique of masculinist hegemony and sexism. She
aspires to do more than simply demand that women be allowed to reach
the same levels of moral development than men, because, once again,
that would leave too much of the methodological and substantive
structure of androcentricity in place. Her affirmative vision is that a
consciousness of the different structure of moral decision-making should
transform the very structures themselves. The different voice seeks to
participate equally in defining and evaluating the process of moral
development analysis itself. To do this she attempts to capture the
substantive dissimilari�ies of these divergent - although not necessarily
incompatible - structures of moral decision-making through the
metaphors of "ladder" and "web". 124
Gilligan posits that the dominant moral ideology and discourse is
primarily hierarchical, ladder-like. It is premised upon a conception of
the self as individuated, separate, autonomous, independent and
essentially the same as other "selfs". As a correlative of this conception of
the self, community relationships, though real and essential, are
considered primarily contractual, competitive and adversarial. These
assumptions, in turn, privilege certain forms of decision-making - both
personal and structural - rather than others. They favour abstraction,
depersonalization and categorization, logic and rationality. They inscribe
a legal system with the attribute of determining rules in order to facilitate
equality, reciprocity, impartiality, fairness and rights. Finally, the ladder
reflects and concentrates within itself an assumption of mutual aggression
and a potential for violence.
Although dominant, the ladder is not all encompassing, it is modified,
and circumscribed by the web. The web is premised upon a conception
of the self as attached, interdependent, connected to other persons, and
primarily relational. Consequently, community is experienced as a
network or narrative of constitutive, co-operative and mutually
vulnerable relationships. These assumptions also privilege certain forms
of decision-making, rather than others. They favour contextual judgment,
empathy, intimacy and sensitivity to the needs of both self and others.
They imbricate the legal system with flexible principles in order to
124. To be slightly more accurate, although Gilligan does explicitly use the metaphor of "the
web", I cannot locate "ladder" in her writings. However she frequently counterposes
"hierarchy" with "web" but I find this less balanced and coherent than "ladder". Ladder is also
the gloss which many commentators have superimposed upon her propositions.
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facilitate responsiveness, generosity, nurturance and concern. Finally, the
web encompasses a s�nse of intimacy, a resistance to hurting others, and
sponsors an ethic of care.
It is crucially important to remember that Gilligan distances herself
fr<;_>m biological determinism. At the very beginning of her book she
categorically asserts,
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but by theme.
Its association with women is an empirical observation and it is primarily
through women's voices that I trace its development. But this association
is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices are
presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought
and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to represent a
generalization about either sex. 125

Thus, despite the occasional identification of difference with
"feminine", 126 difference is thematic and moral, not sociobiological,
gender reductionist nor sex exclusive. Gilligan's project, in part, is to
"yield a more encompassing view of the lives of both sexes",127 and to
challenge the "distortions" 128 perpetrated by our current atomistic
worldview. 129
Moreover, late in her book, Gilligan indicates that there already exists
the experience of, and thereby the potential for, the expansion of
difference in men's lives. She suggests that the intimacy which men
sometimes experience in their post-adolescent years is the
critical . . . transformative experience for men through which adolescent
identity turns into the generativity of adult love and work . . . the adult
ethic of taking care.130

And, a few pages later, she posits that both women and men tend to
incorporate elements from each of the different moral approaches in their
decision-making processes, although she suggests that this is not
necessarily in equivalent proportions.131 Thus, difference is a question of
degree, not of kind. Gilligan cannot be accused of the biological
reductionism of "sex is destiny".132
125. Voice, at 2; see also Discourse at 38.
126. See e.g., Voice at 105.
127. Voice, at 4.
128. Discourse, at 39.
129. Moreover, she also points out the methodological and empirical limitations of her
research and that,
"such constraints preclude the possibility of generalization and leave to further research
the task of sorting out the different variables of culture, time, occasion and gender,"
Voice at 126.
130. Voice, at 163-164.
131. Voice, at 166-167.
132. See also Discourse, at 47-49.
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These are vitally important points. Her advocacy for difference is not
based on an essentialist, reductionist vision of male/female nature,
absolute, incorrigible, transcendental, reified. Rather, difference needs to
be understood within a broader social context, as culturally 133 and
psychologically134 constructed rather than natural, as a deeply entrenched
ideology, but an ideology nonetheless. 135 The recognition of difference as
ideology - as a pervasive ideology - is itself therapeutic in that it
indicates not only difference's constructedness but also its contingency,136
mutability, plasticity and vulnerability to assessment and valorization.
Moreover, it opens up the potential to ask: valued by whom and for what
reasons? Difference, then, is artifactual, and relational. It does not inhere
in essence of the person, it is not dependent upon maleness or femaleness.
Rather, it is depende�t upon the structure of social relations, it is a
process. As such, since it has been made, it can also be re-made.
Difference, when modernized, allows us to ask fundamental questions of
human agency, questions of responsibility, questions of possibility.
The consequences of choosing one moral position over the other can
be of fundamental importance. If one adopts a different version of moral
development from that which currently prevails,
the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from
competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is
contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception
of morality as concerned with the activity of care centres moral
development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships,
just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the
understanding of rights and rules. 137

Thus, for Gilligan, there do in fact exist, at least, two moralities, the
"morality of rights" and the "morality of responsibility", because the
133. C. Gould, "The Woman Question: The Philosophy of Literature and the Literature of
Philosophy" in Women and Philosophy (C. Gould and M. Wartofsky eds. 1976); L. Finley,
"Choice and Freedom: Illusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice" (1987), 96 Yale L.J.
914, 932-933; R.W. Connell, Gender and Power, (1987).
134. See also Discourse, at 58. At times Gilligan indicates that she has some sympathy for
Chodorow's proposition that identifies the socio-cultural conditions of early childcare as being
im})Ortant for personal gendered development.
135. N. Chodorow, "Gender Relation and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective" in
Future of Difference, supra note 36, at 16. See also Alice Jardine, Prelude to The Future of
Difference at xxv (1980), Monique Wittig, "Paradigm" in Homosexualities and French
Literature 115 (G. Stambolian & E. Marks eds. 1974); Collette Guillaumin, "The Practice and
Power of Belief in Nature: Part I The Appropriation of Women" (1981), l Feminist Issues
3-28; "Part II The Naturalist Discourse" Ibid. 87-109; Minow, "Justice Engendered" (1987),
101 Harvard L.B. 10 at 31.
136. M. Mead, Male and Female (1950); Talcott Parsons, Family Socialization and Interaction
Process (1956); Simone de Beauvior, The Second Sex (1972), all agree on this point despite
their significant differences. See also R. W. Connell, Gender and Power, (1987).
137. Voice at 19.
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former differs from the latter in its "emphasis on separation rather than
connection, in its consideration of the individual rather than the
relationship as primary . . ." 1 38 On a normative level, one can be
understood as an "ethic of care",139 and the other as an ethic of
"indifference",140 "the logic of justice" . 141 Indeed, these different moral
visions of rights and responsibilities condense within themselves implicit
understanding of our nature as social beings, as "a self defined through
separation" and "a self delineated through connection" 142 and where our
priorities lie. Moreover, priorization of one rather than the other has an
impact not only on the results achieved, but also on the very "formulation
of the problem" 143 and on the means chosen for its resolution.
Preconceptions, comprehension, methodology, results and long term
consequences. are interconnected in fundamental ways which reflect and
structure the social order in which we co-exist.
b)

Transcending bipolarism
". . . this problem of dealing with difference without constituting an
opposition may just be what feminism is all about."
Jane Gallop144

Although much of Gilligan's analysis is structured by the counterposing
of the web and the ladder, the distinctive moralities of "rights" and
"responsibilities", her ambition is not to replace one exclusionary
paradigm with another. Rather her aim is at once more modest and more
ambitious, it is integrative rather than supremacist. She calls for a radical
expansion, 145 and hence transformation146 of conventional moral
138. Voice at 19.
139. Later she identifies "the ideal of care as an activity of relationship, of seeing and
responding to need, taking care of the world by sustaining the web of connection, so that no
one is left alone" Voice at 62.
140. Voice at 22.
141. Voice at 30.
142. Voice at 35.
143. Voice at 32.
144. Jane Gallop, The Daughters Seduction 93 (1982).
l 45. Voice at l 05 and 173.
l 46. Voice at 25. Similar distinctions between transformation and revolution can be located
in the work of Adrienne Rich. For example in Lies, Secrets and Silences (1979) in discussing
poetry, Rich opines,
". . . As long as our language is inadequate, our vision remains formless, our thinking
and feeling are still running in old cycles, our process may be "revolutionary" but not
transformative . . . When we speak of transformation [instead of revolution] we speak
more accurately out of the vision of a process which will leave neither surfaces nor
depths unchanged, which enters society at the most essential level of the subjugation of
women and nature by men. We begin to conceive a planet on which both women and
nature might coexist as the She Who we encounter in Judy Grahn's poems. Poetry is,
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development theory with its predeliction for equating maturity with
separation, not its junking. Her strategy is deviationist 147 and
heterogeneous, not revolutionary. Her vision is holistic rather than
partial, seeking a fusion of "identity and intimacy". 148
As an example of her suggestion for the transformative potential of
fusion, she provides the example of two children, a girl and a boy,
wanting to play different games. The girl wanted to play next-door
neighbours, the boy wanted to play pirates. The resolution of the
disagreement was not the mere addition of the two games, or the fair
solution of taking turns, but an inclusive or "synergistic" solution,149 "the
pirate who lives next door". In this scenario, Gilligan argues, a new game
develops; different from what either of the children imagined
separately. 150 She proposes that the articulation of the different voice
allows us to identify elements of our moral characters that had been
previously understood as inferior. Nor, at this point, does she distinguish
between gender, both are encouraged to recognize the "other" in
themselves. 151 What Gilligan is taking us towards is an emphasis on the
substantive difference of difference, without exaggerating the differences
between us as people. 152
among other things, a criticism of language . . . Poetry is above all a concentration of
the power of language, which is the power of our ultimate relationship to everything in
the universe. It is as if forces we can lay claim to in no other way, become present to
us in sensuous form."
Catharine MacKinnon, at least on occasion, prefers revolution. "Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory" (1987), 7 Signs 515 at 564 [hereinafter cited
as Agenda].
147. For a discussion of deviationist strategy in the service of legal doctrinal praxis, see
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986).
148. Voice at 159.
149. Discourse, Carrie Menke! Meadow at 54.
150. Discourse at 45. There are strong parallels here with Miles' "integrative" proposals; see
supra note 21, and infra at 56-57.
151. Gilligan emphasizes that the transformation that she aspires to is not androgyny.
(Discourse at 45 and 84.) The problem with androgyny, it seems, is that it does not challenge
patriarchy adequately; it aspires to conjunction, not transformation. S.L. Ben, "The
Measurement of Psychological Androgyny" (1976), 42 J. Consult. Clin. Psych. 155; Herbert
Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism" (1974), 2 Women's Studies 279 at 287, and Olsen, supra
note 8 advocate androgyny.
152. See also Joan Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference To a Theory of Care" (1987), 12
Signs 644. The following capture Gilligan's sense of the nature of post-conventional morality:
The reinterpretation of women's experience in terms of their own imagery of
relationships thus clarifies that experience and also provides a nonhierarchical vision of
human connection. Since relationships, when cast in the image of hierarchy, appear
inherently unstable and morally problematic, their transpos'ition into the image of web
changes an order of inequality into the structure of interconnection. But the power of
the images of hierarchy and web, their evocation of feelings and their recurrence in
thought, signifies the embeddedness of both of these images in the cycle of human life.
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iii) The Ethic of Care
Can the decision "to experiment with love . . . be reconciled with the
decision to fight for equal power?"
V. Held153

Even more significant than her espousal of difference are Gilligan's
suggestions as to what she understands to be the correlative of the
consciousness of difference: the ethic of care. "Yet in the different voice
of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie between relationship
and responsibility and the origins of aggression in the failure of
connection."154
Gilligan's discussion of the ethic of care is not developed in any
autonomous or comprehensive sense. Rather, it surfaces in her work as a
corrective or complement to "the logic of justice", "the premise of
equality", as a resisting countermorality to the morality of rights.
However, I think it is possible to distill from her reflections some of its
interlocking components. Its central insight is an awareness of the
constitutive interconnection and interdependence of the self and other.
This consciousness of mutuality militates against isolation and
separatism, the "pact of withdrawn selfs" 155 with its correlative potential
for selfishness, aggression and violence. The ethic of care encourages a
recognition of, and enthusiasm for, the needs of others and a willingness
The experiences of inequality and interconnection, inherent in the relation of parent and
child, then give rise to the ethics of justice and care, the ideals of human relationship the vision that self and other will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences
in power, things will be fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included,
that no one will be left alone or hurt. These disparate visions in their tension reflect the
paradoxical truths of human experience - that we know ourselves as separate only
insofar as we live in connection with others, and that we experience relationship only
insofar as we differentiate other from self,
Voice at 62-63.
Development for both sexes would therefore seem to entail an integration of rights and
responsibilities through the discovery of the complementarity of these disparate views.
For women, the integration of rights and responsibilities takes place through an
understanding of the psychological logic of relationships. This understanding tempers
the self-distructive potential of a self-critical morality by asserting the need of all persons
for care. For men, recognition through experience of the need for more active
responsibility in taking care corrects the potential indifference of a morality of
noninterference and turns attention from the logic to the consequences of choice . . . In
the development of a postconventional ethical understanding, women come to see the
violence inherent in inequality, while men come to see the limitations of a conception
of justice blinded to the differences in human life,
Voice at 100.
153. In "Marx, Sex and the Transformation of Society" in C. Gould, M. Wartofsky Women
andPhilosophy (1916), 168, 180.
154. Voice, 173.
155. I take this phrase from Peter Gabel, "The Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and
the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves" (1984), 62 Texas L.Rev. 1563.
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to respond compassionately and responsibly to those needs, 156 to
participate in the lived experiences and reality of others. 157 It identifies "a
world of mutuality" that "creates and sustains the human community". 158
It reconceptualizes and reconstructs moral dilemmas to be issues of
competing responsibilities of the self because of its connection with and
responsibility for others, rather than a conflict between self and other in
which the only options are assertion of the selfs trumping rights, or
martyred self-sacrifice on the pyre of altruism. 159 Moreover, it proposes
that moral decisions be made on the basis of specific, contextual and
particular 160 problems and not a priori, hypothetical abstractions. Finally,
and of particular importance for this essay, not only does it encourage a
discourse and praxis that rejects domination, it strives to resolve moral
dilemmas without recourse to violence as that would counteract "the
injunction not to hurt others''. 161 In so far as the ethic of care is premised
upon "nonviolence"162 it aspires to "a more generative view of human
life", 163 and even more ambitiously, an affirmative transformation of the
polity.
It is important to point out, though, that the ethic of care is distinct
from the traditional masculinist stereotype of "female self-abnegation and
moral self-sacrifice", 164 that Virginia Woolf has described as "The Angel
1 56. Voice at 62 at 74-98.
157. Voice at 79. A similar theme can also be located in Minow, "Justice Engendered" supra
note 135 at 14, ". . . the perspective to seek out and appreciate a perspective other than ones
own . . .".
158. Voice at 156.
159. Voice at 1 14.
160. Voice at 101.
161. Voice at 73, 102, 134, 1 49, 174.
162. Voice at 174.
163. Voice at 174.
164. Voice at 90, Discourse at 46. Deborah Kearns suggests that even the most sophisticated
and progressive liberal of the late twentieth century incorporates a vision of women as self
sacrificing into his work, "A Theory of Justice - and Love; Rawls on the Family" (1983), 18
Politics 2, 36. For a powerful critique of this "denial" interpretation of women's identity see
Robin West's groundbreaking article, "The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Liberal and Radical Feminist Legal Theory" (manuscript;
forthcoming 1 Wisconsin Women's Law Journal hereinafter cited as "Hedonic Lives"). West
argues that if women are accurately understood as "giving selves" this has come about because
of the "pervasive threat of violent and acquisitive male sexuality" which bas resulted in
women, driven by fear, "re-constructing themselves in a way that controls the danger and
suppresses the fear. . . . This does not make her an altruistic person, it makes her a negative".
Ibid at 15 and 22. In other words, women's identity as "giving selves" is a "coherent,
understandable" defence mechanism to survive patriarchal oppression, not authentic feminism.
As the text makes clear, the ethic of care approach does not reduce to an interpretation of
women as "giving selves", it is not a servile interpretation of women's moral character and
promise. Indeed, later in her paper West also considers the possibility of an ethic of care absent
the dangers of patriarchy. Ibid at 38; See also her reflections on the importance of trust in
human relations. Ibid at 61-62.
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in the House'\ 165 It should not be confused with passivity or delicacy,
submissiveness or obedience, dependence or domesticity; it is not what
Irigaray has posited to be a 'phallic feminine", 166 nor "a romantic
prescription for chaining women to the classical definition of
femininity". 167 Indeed, Gilligan's own example refutes such self-negation,
for at least some of the women to whom she listened decided to have
abortions, thereby demonstrating that care does not necessarily priorize
the other over the self. Rather, care attempts to consider the interests of
the other in a responsive and responsible manner. The ethic of care
includes care for oneself. 168 It denies the absolutist, 169 formalistic recourse
to individual autonomy by favouring an "injunction against hurting"170
so that we have to seriously and contextually make moral decisions and,
at the same time, bear responsibility for that choice, and its consequences
for others as well as ourselves. The ethic of care necessitates a keen
consciousness of the "social consequences of action". 171
If we relate the ethic of care to the arena of legal relations, to inquire
into the possibility and direction of a "feminist contribution to justice,"172
a fundamental question becomes,
whether or not (law) is hurting society and whether or not it puts a barrier
in the way of compassion and respect.173

When you are inside the barrel with the lid sealed, it is difficult to know
that it is a barrel you are imprisoned in. What the ethic of care may do
is to provide a corrigible and provisional benchmark or vantage point by
which to understand law, to interpret law, to question law, to evaluate
law in the politico-historical conjuncture in which we now find
ourselves. 174 As Kathy Ferguson notes, "Any thorough-going critique
165. Women and Writing 59 (1979).
166. Cited in Duchen, supra note 81, at 87.
167. K. Karst, "Women's Constitution" (1984), Duke L.J. 447, 480. Emphatically, although
there is some verbal intersection, the ethic of care is not what MacKinnon has described as
"contemporary industrial society's version of women . . . docile, soft, passive, nurturant,
vulnerable, weak, narcissistic, childlike, incompetant, masochistic and domestic, made for child
care, home care and husband care". "Agenda" supra note 146 at 530. Moreover, lest there be
any confusion, I want to stress that nothing in my suggestions is premised upon the idea that
the ethic of care grows out of the rosy private family life of women. For many women the
family is anything but a haven in a heartless world; it is, in many instances, the locus of extreme
domination, subordination, inequality and violence.
168. Voice at 139.
169. Discourse, at 46.
170. See supra note 161.
171. Voice at 167.
172. Dunlap, Discourse at 13.
173. Voice at 123.
174. For a useful discussion of why it is important to provide normative authority for legal
praxis, see D. Cornell, "Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions of Community in the
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rests, ultimately, on a v1s10n of an alternative possibility". 175 The
discourse of care helps provide such a "critical ethical perspective". 176 If
my earlier suggestions as to the relationship of contemporary law and
violence are accurate then law, when measured against the ethic of care,
is clearly found wanting. If difference, feminism and the ethic of care are
connected, then the feminist recourse to law, as currently constituted, is
problematic. The critique may not be sufficiently extensive, and the
reconstruction may not go far enough.
But law itself should not be abandoned or abdicated because, in my
opinion, feminists simply cannot afford to vacate the field. Rather it
should be transformed, reconstructed, remade so as to come closer to the
ethic of care, to be the socio-political concretization of the ethic of care,
"to become more of � healer, less of a slayer''. 177 Indeed, as Gilligan
herself suggests, law is not monolithic, for inscribed within contemporary
law there exist traces of a different voice in "the concept of equity, the
recognition of differences in need". 178
c) Equality Revisited
i) MacKinnon :S Response to Difference
It is true that in our history, stereotypical differences, both real and
imagined have served primarily as convenient, "natural" justifications for
impositions of burdens. It does not follow, however, that we cannot use
differences progressively. Injustice does not flow directly from recognizing
differences; injustice results when those differences are transformed into
social and economic deprivation.
Ann Scales179

Gilligan's work has received a mixed response from the feminist legal
academic community. Some commentators have accepted the idea but
not necessarily the substance of a different voice. 180 Others have been
enthusiastic about the substance of the different voice and have attempted
to apply it to their legal practice. 181 Others have been skeptical.
Law" (1987), 54 Tenn. L.Rev. 327; "Toward a Modern/Post Modern Reconstruction of
Ethics" (1 985), 133 U. Pa. L.Rev. 291. See also K. O'Donovan, "Women's perspectives on the
Rule of Law" (unpublished manuscript).
175. The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy ( 1984).
176. Gilligan, "Reply to the Critics" ( 1986), 1 1 Signs 324, 327.
177. Dunlap in Discourse at 20.
178. Voice at 1 64.
179. "Feminist Jurisprudence" (1986), 95 Yale L.J. 1 373, 1 396.
1 80. See e.g., Suzannah Sherry, "Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication" (1986), 72 Va. L.Rev. 543; but see also her, "The Gender of Judges" (1986),
4 Law and Inequality 159.
181. Minow, "Justice Engendered" supra, note 135; Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation" ( 1984), 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 754, 763 fn. 28; "Portia in a Different
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It has become commonplace within the legal academy to identify the
work of Catharine MacKinnon as the most trenchant critique of
difference, and particularly difference as articulated by Gilligan. The
reasons for this widely held belief are not difficult to identify: MacKinnon
has publicly challenged Gilligan's work 182 and specifies that the critique
of difference is one of the organizing themes for her book, Feminism
Unmodified
In this section I want to suggest that the first blush impression of
Gilligan and MacKinnon as being locked in incorrigible conflict is
oversimplistic. Although MacKinnon certainly does speak out against the
espousal of difference, there remains within her work traces of an
affection for difference, desirable if only the circumstances could be made
appropriate. I want to suggest that the Gilligan-MacKinnon controversy,
though very real, is not as irremediably polarized as it has been
understood and that there is scope for compatibility between these two
extrem�ly important feminist theorists and practitioners.
In the introduction to Feminism Unmodified MacKinnon makes clear
her critical concerns about the tendency to connect gender with
difference on any level:
The second theme is a critique of the notion that gender is basically a
difference rather than a hierarchy. To treat gender as a difference (with or
without a French accent) means to treat it as a bipolar distinction, each
pole of which is defined in contrast to the other by opposed intrinsic
attributes. Beloved ofleft and right alike, construing gender as a difference,
termed simply the gender difference, obscures and legitimizes the way
gender is imposed by force. 183

Lest there be any doubt, she emphasises that her criticism is not aimed
solely at biologically reductionist versions of gender as difference, but at
all efforts to connect gender and difference:
It hides that force behind a static description of gender as a biological or
social or mythic or semantic partition, engraved or inscribed or inculcated
by god, nature, society (agents unspecified), the unconscious or the
cosmos. The idea of difference helps keep the reality of male dominance
in place. 184
Voice" (1985), l Berkley W.L.J.; Linda Krieger, "Through a Glass Darkly: Paradigms of
Equality and the Search for a Woman's Jurisprudence" (1987), 2 Hypatia 45; Karst,
"Women's Constitution" (1984), Duke L.J. 447; Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals and the Law"
in Justice Beyond Orwell 77 (Abella ed. 1985); Spiegelman, "Court Ordered Hiring Quotas
After Stotts" (1985), 20 Harvard C.L.C.R.L.Rev.; E. Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics" (1986), 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 589; F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983), 96 Harvard L.Rev. 1497; J. Rifkin, "Mediation from a
Feminist Perspective; Promise and Problems" (1984), 2 Law and Inequality 21.
182. Discourse.
183. Feminism Unmodified at 3.
184. Feminism Unmodified at 3.
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It is difficult to imagine a more total rejection of difference, or any of
its potential justifications or foundations. Difference, for MacKinnon, is
not about gender, but about power, force and the continued supremacy
of men over women. Difference is a rationalization and legitimation of an
illegitimate hierarchy which disadvantages women thereby reinforcing,
rather than challenging, their status as "second class citizens". 185
Difference, for MacKinnon, is a second order concept and experience.
Power, or more precisely, the inequality of power, is the primary building
block for a feminist analysis of social and legal relations. The meaning of
gender and difference are predetermined by power relations between
men and women, which are relationships of fundamental inequality.
Consequently,
a discourse of gender difference serves as ideology to neutralize,
rationalize, and cover disparities of power, even as it appears to criticize
them. Difference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination. This is
as true when differences are affirmed as when they are denied, when their
substance is applauded or when it is disparaged, when women are
punished or when they are protected in their name. 186

Thus, for MacKinnon, difference is a repressive dead end, "one strategy
in keeping women down".187 Because it is a "conceptual tool of gender
inequality, it cannot deconstruct the master's house. Especially when it
has built it."188 Difference cannot be salvaged for the feminist critique of
patriarchy, and its espousal is "one of the most deceptive antifeminisms
in society, scholarship, politics and law . . ."189 An unmodified feminism
rejects difference.
MacKinnon expands her critique of difference in "On Difference and
,
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination",190 and discusses Gilligan s work
explicitly. Her basic disagreement with Gilligan is that the latter accepts
and valorizes those values which men have either permitted women to
have or have valued women for. Thus, she accuses Gilligan of failing to
challenge at its core the male construction of gender relations - which
are hierarchical and unequal - and worse, of legitimizing those relations
through an affirmation of the "qualities and characteristics of
powerlessness": 191
185. Feminism Unmodified at 4.
186. Feminism Unmodified at 8. Similar criticisms have been levelled against the N.F.F.'s. See
for example Emmanuelle de Lesseps, "Le Fait Feminin: et moi?" in (1979), 5 Questions
feministes 4, cited in Duchen supra note 81 at 21.
187. Feminism Unmodi,fied at 22.
188. Feminism Unmodified at 9.
189. Feminism Unmodified at 8.
190. Feminism Unmodified ch. 2.
191. Feminism Unmodified at 39.
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I am getting hard on this and am about to get harder on it. I do not think
that the way women reason morally is morality "in 1;t different voice". I
think it is morality in a higher register, in the feminine voice. Women
value care because men have valued us according to the care we give
them, and we could probably use some. Women think in relational terms
because their existence is defined in relation to men. Further, when you
are powerless, you don't just speak differently. A lot, you don't speak.
Your speech is not just differently articulated, it is silenced. Eliminated,
gone. You aren't just deprived of a language with which to articulate your
distinctiveness, although you are; you are deprived of a life out of which
articulation might come. Not being heard is not just a function of lack of
recognition, not just that no one knows how to listen to you, although it
is that; it is also silence of the deep kind, the silence of being prevented
from having anything to say. Sometimes it is permanent. All I am saying
is that the damage of sexism is real, and reifying that into differences is an
insult to our·possibilities. 192

The discourse of difference, for MacKinnon, is insufficiently cognizant
of power relations to be a fruitful strategy for feminism. The better
approach is to view feminism through the prism of power, and to
indentify the conditions of inequality perpetrated by male supremacy. If
difference is real it is because dominance pre-exists and determines the
nature that difference, structuring it to men's advantage and women's
disadvantage. The "dominance approach", as MacKinnon calls it,193
provides an alternative, power-conscious, perspective from which to
identify and challenge women's continued oppression and subordination.
From this perspective difference is understood as problematic rather than
emancipatory, mapping inequality rather than challenging it.
From the point of view of the dominance approach, it becomes clear that
the difference approach adopts the point of view of male supremacy on the
status of the sexes. Simply by treating the status quo or "the standard", it
invisibly and uncritically accepts the arrangements under male supremacy.
In this sense, the difference approach is masculinist, although it can be
expressed in a female voice. The dominance approach, in that it sees the
inequalities of the social world from the standpoint of the subordination of
women to men, is feminist. 194

The gist of MacKinnon's critique, then, is that the espousal of
difference sounds uncomfortably reminiscent of the old stereotypes 195 and
cliches that have been traditionally used by men to confirm the inferiority
192. Feminism Unmodified at 39 (footnotes omitted).
193. Feminism Unmodified at 40.
194. Feminism Unmodified at 42-43.
195. For a particularly useful analysis and critique of the dangers of stereotyping which has
reinforced the inequality of women, blacks, Jews and the lower classes, see Sander L. Gilman,
Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes ofSexuality, Race andMadness (1985).

Devlin: Transformation or Resistance

1 63

of women, to legitimize inequality and to maintain the relations of
domination and subordination. MacKinnon argues that the affirmation of
difference does nothing to empower women, and indeed, because the foot
is on the neck196 it is more like masculinist ventriloquism. The authentic,
unmodified voice of feminism is the dominance approach, because only
it "strives towards equal power in the social life". 197 For MacKinnon,
difference may be feminism's double-cross. 198
ii) Reflections on MacKinnon
Far too often, however, feminists appear too confident that we have
successfully freed ourselves from the constraining categories and norms of
the male-stream thought within which all of us in this generation were
trained . . . It is hard to know what to save and what to discard from male
stream thought as we proceed forward on our journey. Some of us have
clearly saved too much and are overburdened with antique baggage which
slows our progress. Others have, perhaps, discarded rather too much too
early.
Jill McCalla Vickers 199

MacKinnon's comments are both timely and important. They are timely
in that they provide an important counterbalance to some of the more
euphoric elements within feminism whose faith in difference was perhaps
leading them towards romanticism and idealism,200 and was insufficiently
cognizant of the structures and actors of resistance. Her insights are
important in that they remind us, once again, that there is "no such thing
as 'keeping out of politics' "201 and that gender, like morality, has as a
constitutive element questions of power and powerlessness. For example,
if we return to Gilligan's suggested transformation of the girl/boy,
neighbour/pirate game the problem is even more serious than the boy
opting out. The very real danger may be bringing the pirate home . . . for
if pirates rape and pillage, then the new game may be the pirate raping
the girl next door! 202
MacKinnon reminds us that, historically, difference has been perceived
as deviant, inferior, invalid; that it has inscribed within it an ideological
weight that disadvantages women. Her concerns about the danger of
196. Feminism Unmodified at 30.
197. Feminism Unmodified at 45.
198. Elizabeth Meese, supra note 57 at 75-76.
199. In Feminism in Canada, supra note 14, at 44-45.
200. See for example, Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking" and "Preservative Love and
Military Destruction" in Mothering, supra note 18 at 213, 231; Barbara Love and Elizabeth
Shinklin, "The· Answer is Matriarchy", ibid at 275.
201. George Orwell, cited in W. Mitchell, The Politics ofInterpretation 3 (1983).
202. I wish to thank Colleen MacKay for suggesting this response to Gilligan's proposal.
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difference, with it tendency to reconfirm the traditional stereotypes,203
thereby entrenching rather than dislocating hierarchy and inequality, are
made the more real when we realize that both anti-feminist women and
contemporary Christian fundamentalists also espouse difference, claiming
that men are "aggressive, dominant, logical, independent, active and task
oriented", while women are "submissive, intuitive, dependent, nurturant,
supportive, patient and person-oriented".204 No doubt such correspon
dences are a serious cause for concern for any progressive movement, and
justify a critical skepticism towards invocation of difference. However,
skepticism is not rejection, and MacKinnon appears to favour rejecting in
toto the discourse of difference. But can feminism afford to surrender the
ideology of difference to masculinist hegemony? In the past, antifeminists
have used, and. will continue to use, difference in support of their political
agenda. Even if MacKinnon is correct that, historically, difference has
contributed to the inferiorization of women, does that mean that
difference is inherently incapable of being salvaged for feminism,
reconstructed and revalued so as to be a positive, even emancipatory,
ideology? As I understand her writings, MacKinnon disagrees. Her
preference, I think, is for a "degendering"205 of society, for gender is a
construct of hierarchy, a product of the inequality of power between men
and women. The validity of such a position depends upon the validity of
MacKinnon's "dominance thesis" and its central concept, power. It is to
a discussion of these issues that we can now turn.
a) MacKinnon on Power
. . . the pitfall of being reduced into joining the oppressor under the
pretense of sharing power
Audre Lorde206
203. See for example Freud, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction
Between the Sexes" in On Sexuality Vol. 7, 342 (A. Richard ed. 1977); T. Reik, OfLove and
Lust: On the Psychoanalysis ofEmotional and Sexual Emotions (1967).
204. See for example, W. Peter Blitchington, "God had A Purpose in Creating Two Sexes"
Sex Roles and the Christian Family Ch. 3 ( 1985); Marabel Morgan, The Total Woman (1975).
205. I take this term from Nancy Chodorow, "Gender, Relation and Difference in
Psychoanalytic Theory" in Future of Difference (1980) at 3. This claim is based upon my
understanding ofMacKinnon's argument. Her premise is that power, in the nature of hierarchy
and inequality, domination and subordination, pre-exists. Gender is encoded with these pre
existing power relations, "the eroticization of dominance and submission creates gender,
creates woman and man in the social form in which we know them". Feminism Unmodified
at 50. To challenge the conditions of inequality necessitates a challenge to the formative
structures of powerlessness, including gender. Society has to be de-gendered, for gender is·
premised upon inequality. As the overall theme of this article might suggest, my preference is
for a reconstitution of gender not its eradication. See also R.W. Connell, Gender and Power,
286-293 (1987).
206. Sister Outsider 118, (1984).
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Si les femmes veulent prendre le pouvoir a la maniere des hommes, ce
n'est pas la peine, c'est ce que nous voudrions changer justement, toutes
ces notions et ces valeurs.
Simone de Beauvoir207

An overview of MacKinnon's discussion of power leaves one dissatisfied,
for her analysis is more assertion than analysis. Although, on occasion,
she posits that feminism will transform power208 she says very little on
what that transformation might mean. Rather, as we have seen,
MacKinnon filters her analysis of power through the prism of gender and
its connection with hierarchy, authority and inequality; domination and
subordination; force and violence.
Her argument is that male power is pervasive and systemic, not only
in the public and private realms but also epistemologically, methodolog
ically and philosophically. As she says elsewhere, male dominance is
"metaphysically nearly perfect."209 In short, women are both personally
and structurally disempowered: men have power, women do not.
Consequently, the goal of feminism must, first and foremost, be to enable
women to have the same power as men, and then women can begin to
articulate more authentically their aspirations.
Is this an adequate understanding and conceptionalization of the
economy of powe_r?
Although it is an instructive, readily accessible and critical approach to
power, its totalistic viewpoint is a cause for concern.210 MacKinnon
appears to accept without question what elsewhere211 she identifies as a
male conception of power: domination. Her claim that male domination
is all pervasive is a quantative conception of power, but not a qualitative
one. It does not address the issue of the nature of power. Moreover, it
seems to me that her demand that women are entitled to equal power as
men assumes a zero-sum conception of power: that more power for
women will mean less power for men.
207. Les ecrits de Simone De Beauvoir (1979), C. Francis, E. Gontier (eds.) at 589.
208. See for example, Feminism Unmodified at 23 and 53.
209. "Marxism, Feminism, Method and the State: Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983),
8 Signs 613 [hereinafter cited as "Feminist Jurisprudence"]. See also V. Held, "Feminism and
Epistemology: Recent Work on the Connection between Gender and Knowledge" (1985), 14
Philosophy and Public Affairs 296; Jill McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile",
in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14 at 27.
210. For similar concerns about the prevalance of "generic" statements about power/
powerlessness, shared by both sociologists and feminists see Ann Duffy, "Reformulating Power
for Women" (1986), 23 Can. R. Soc. and Anth. 22.
211. "To us it is a male notion that power means someone must dominate" Feminism
Unmodified at 23. Kathy Lahey appears to accept an essentialist conception of power: "the
very concept of power is a male vision" and "the ultimate sources of power are violence and
tyranny", "Equality and Women's Specificity in Feminist Thought" at 7 (unpublished
manuscript).
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I think such an approach manifests a unilateral conception of power.
It understands power in the Weberian sense of "power over",212 a
negative and repressive approach, what Foucault identifies as a juridical
conception of power.213 But power is more than simply pervasive and
systemic; it is also heterogeneous, polymorphous and multifaceted.214
Power can also be understood in the sense of "power to" as well as
"power over". "Power to" is power as a cognate of freedom, a
progressive, emancipatory and potentially transformative conception of
power, a conception which emphasizes the creative, capacity-enhancing,
ability-encouraging variations of power.215 This is a qualitatively different
conception of power. Men may understand and use power in its
imperialistic guise in order to crush women (other men, and nature) but
that does not mean that "power over" is the immutable essence of power.
212. Weber defines power as ". . . the chance of a man or a number of men (sic) to realize their
will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the
action", in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 180 (H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds.
1958).
213. Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1972).
214. The following reflections on power are influenced, in part, by the work of Foucault
although they aspire to a very different, that is optimistic, agenda than his. He suggests that
traditional conceptions of power are based upon three assumptions: 1 ) power is possessed; 2)
power is primarily coercive, it is a repressive prohibition backed by sanctions, and 3) power
is centralized and tends to be hierarchical, it flows from the top down.
Foucault argues that these assumptions unduly constrain our understanding of power, that
wer
has many variations beyond the juridical conception. Thus he argues that power is
po
exercised rather than possessed, thereby emphasizing a more relational understanding of
power. Second, we can understand power as productive as well as repressive. This claim
becomes most apparent through his discussion of the connection between knowledge and
power. Knowledge as power constructs, creates and moulds our understanding of ourselves,
our relations and our world. Power, therefore, can be proactive and creative, rather than just
sanction-determined. Third, and as a correlative of his first and second theses, if power is
exercisable, relational and creative, then it can be located elsewhere than in centralized
authorities. Put differently, power is a micro-phenomenon as well as a macro-phenomenon
(although the two are inter-related), it can be exercised through our everyday relations, from
the bottom up, as well as from the top down, as localized centres of resistance, reconstruction
and empowerment, as well as domination, either on the micro or macro levels. See Foucault,
Power/Knowledge (1972); Discipline and Punish (1979); The History of Sexuality (1980);
Jana Sawicki, "Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference" (1986), 2 Hypatia
23; Irene Diamond, Lee Quinby, Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Strategies of
Resistance (1988).
Though I do not propose some meta-normative project, I am also more optimistic than
Foucault who resists envisioning transformation, mostly because of his anti-humanism, his
post-modem skepticism.
215. Yolande Cohen, in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14, at 236 and Geraldine Finn ibid.
at 302. For example, certain of the privileges of citizenship can be understood as "power to",
rather than "power over". The Oxford English Dictionary also suggests these various
conceptions, beginning with "power to" but ending with "power over": "The ability to do
something . . . possession of control or command over others; domination; government; sway;
authority . . . ability to compel obedience . . . wage war. . . ." See also Moi, Supra note 2 at 124125 for a discussion of Cixous' conception of "power to".

